General Medical Council v Jooste

An interim order for suspension may be extended where the statutory criteria are satisfied and the investigation requires further time. A contention that a practitioner has resigned or been deregistered cannot determine the application unless that issue is properly before the court. The court may extend the order while warning the regulator that investigations must progress and that further extensions may not be granted automatically.

The General Medical Council applied under section 41A(6) and (7) of the Medical Act 1983 to extend an interim order suspending Dr Jooste’s registration. The order had originally been imposed in October 2009 and had previously been reviewed and extended, including by Owen J until 8 April 2012.

Dr Jooste opposed the application, relying on a document which he said had deregistered him from the Council. The court considered the effect of that contention, in circumstances where a related application before Silber J had been dismissed and no separate application concerning resignation or deregistration was before the court.

1. The application to extend the interim order was granted. The order was extended from 8 April 2012 until 7 April 2013 under section 41A(6) and (7) of the Medical Act 1983.
2. The court was satisfied that this was a proper case for an extension. The allegations were serious, the investigation was complex and the material before the court explained delays arising from the police investigation, judicial processes and delays in obtaining information.
3. Dr Jooste’s contention that he had resigned from the General Medical Council did not affect the application. As in the related proceedings before Silber J, no application dealing with that issue was before the court. The issue had been raised only in argument and could not be determined in these proceedings.
4. The court noted that the Court of Appeal might consider the related decision and reach a different view, but that possibility had no direct implication for the present application.
5. The Council was expected to progress the investigations. The court stated that it should not assume that any further extension would be granted.
6. Permission to appeal was refused because there was no realistic prospect of successfully challenging the extension order. Costs were awarded to the Council, but limited to £1,965, the amount awarded on the earlier extension application.

The judgment was a first-instance application in the Administrative Court. It records an earlier extension by Owen J until 8 April 2012, but no appellate decision concerning the present application.