Hunt v Times Newspapers Ltd

In a challenge to amended defences, the court held that a serious inference may be pleaded where the assumed facts make the inference legitimate and give adequate notice of the case. In a Reynolds privilege context, public interest depends on the subject-matter, the allegations included, and the quality of the journalism. The duty to verify becomes more demanding as the allegation becomes more serious, particularly for a firm allegation of guilt. Responsible journalism may sometimes rely on the cumulative effect of material, including police records, without independent verification of every allegation. That is not an automatic rule. The court must focus intensely on the facts and balance the competing rights under Articles 8 and 10.

The claimant brought a defamation claim against the defendant newspaper. Following an earlier judgment on amendments concerning justification and Reynolds privilege, the defendant reformulated parts of its defence. The remaining disputes concerned particulars alleging that the claimant had used a Jersey company to launder criminal proceeds, the factual material relied on to support responsible journalism, documents attached to the pleading, and a plea of general bad reputation.

The court had to decide whether the amended allegations and supporting material were legally capable of being pleaded, or whether they were inadequately particularised, speculative, evidential rather than factual, or liable to reverse the burden of proof.

1. The allegation that the claimant used a company to launder criminal proceeds was permitted to stand. The court assumed that the pleaded facts would be proved at trial and concluded that the proposed inference was legitimate. The pleading made clear the case to be met and created no unfair burden in disclosure or evidence.

2. The Reynolds defence was assessed by reference to the public interest in the subject-matter, editorial judgment, and responsible journalism. The article concerned an alleged benefit obtained by criminals from compulsory acquisition of land. That subject-matter was plainly of public interest, but serious allegations of guilt required convincing and sufficiently specific support.

3. The duty of verification is assessed on a spectrum. It contains subjective and objective elements: the journalist must believe the allegation and hold that belief reasonably. The duty becomes more onerous with the gravity of the allegation. For a firm, level-one Chase allegation, the journalist must have reasonable grounds for satisfying himself that the claimant was guilty of the charge.

4. Material consisting only of repeated allegations, an unidentified source, a previous publication, guilt by association, or assertion without verification was insufficient in the pleaded form. Some material could nevertheless contribute to the overall assessment where it formed part of a continuing and cumulative body of research. Quality, consistency, frequency and pervasiveness could be relevant, as could quantity.

5. Police records have no blanket immunity. Their official status may be relevant, but police records are not inherently infallible. Whether material recorded by the police can support responsible journalism requires an intense focus on the particular facts and a proportionality judgment balancing Articles 8 and 10. The court left the more exceptional allegations for the trial judge.

6. Pleadings must state concise facts, not evidence. However, documents could be relied on in the pleading, without incorporation by reference, if relevant to the decision to publish and disclosure did not breach restrictions imposed in other proceedings. The court allowed the disputed documentary material to remain subject to those qualifications.

7. A plea of general bad reputation was allowed to stand. Parliament had retained the rule in Scott v Sampson. Such a plea consists of general assertions as to reputation and need not particularise the grounds for that reputation.