Gudzelak v Judicial Authority In Krosno, Poland

Under Extradition Act 2003, passage of time bars extradition only where return would be unjust or oppressive. A fugitive who knowingly leaves the requesting state while aware of an outstanding sentence cannot ordinarily rely on the passage of time. Hardship, as a usual consequence of extradition, is insufficient to establish oppression. Interference with family life under Article 8 will ordinarily be proportionate unless an exceptionally compelling feature or combination of features is shown.

The appellant appealed against an order of Senior District Judge Riddle at Westminster Magistrates’ Court directing his extradition to Poland to serve the balance of a custodial sentence for robbery. He relied on the passage of time and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He had left Poland in 2004 while aware that part of his sentence remained outstanding and had established family and employment in the United Kingdom. The central issues were whether extradition was barred by passage of time or was disproportionate interference with family life.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant had been present when convicted and knew, when he left Poland, that a substantial part of his sentence remained outstanding. He had also been made aware of the consequences of failing to comply with the conditions of his temporary release. He was therefore a fugitive from justice.
2. Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires consideration of whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the relevant passage of time. The meanings of those terms remained as formulated in Kakis v Government of the Republic of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779. The approach was affirmed in Gomes & Goodyer v Trinidad and Tobago [2009] 1 WLR 1038.
3. Applying that approach, the appellant could not rely on the passage of time because he was a fugitive. In any event, the consequences relied upon amounted to hardship, not oppression. The length of time and the appellant’s personal circumstances did not make extradition oppressive.
4. As to Article 8, Norris v Government of the United States of America [2010] UKSC 9 established that interference with family life caused by extradition would be disproportionate only where some exceptionally compelling feature or combination of features was present. The appellant’s partner, children, home and employment did not approach that threshold. His physical and mental condition also provided no separate ground for refusing extradition.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: On 30 March 2012, Senior District Judge Riddle ordered the appellant’s extradition to Poland.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was dismissed on 31 May 2012.