A, Re (Disclosure of Third Party Information)

Disclosure in contact proceedings is governed by a balance between the right to a fair hearing and the privacy, health and safety rights of those affected. A fair hearing does not create an absolute right to inspect every document. The court must consider the practical consequences of disclosure, including whether the information can be tested and whether disclosure would achieve anything useful. Compelling a vulnerable third party to give evidence may be oppressive where the medical risks are severe and available protective measures are inadequate. Disclosure of identity and allegations may likewise be refused where confidentiality cannot be controlled, the identity and allegations are inseparable, and disclosure without evidence would not materially assist the child or the parties. Future contact arrangements remain governed by the child’s welfare.

The proceedings concerned contact between a nine-year-old girl and her father. A young person, X, made allegations that the father had seriously sexually abused her, but refused further participation and opposed disclosure of her identity and records. The local authority had warned the mother of a credible allegation while withholding identifying information. The parents, the child’s Guardian and X sought different forms of disclosure. The central issues were whether X’s identity, allegations, personal and medical history should be disclosed, and whether she should be compelled to give evidence, having regard to the parties’ Convention rights and the medical evidence concerning X’s health.

1. The application for disclosure of further information about X and her allegations was dismissed. The court had to balance Article 6 rights to a fair hearing, Article 8 rights to family and private life, and Article 3 protections against inhuman or degrading treatment.

2. A fair hearing does not confer an absolute right to see all documents. The rights of third parties must also be considered. A full hearing may be unavailable where it is impracticable or where the rights of others should prevail.

3. The court was required to consider the different levels of disclosure together with the likely consequences of any disclosure. It was not realistic to decide disclosure without asking where the process would lead, including the likely application for a witness summons.

4. Compelling X to give evidence would be oppressive and wrong. The medical evidence established a serious risk to her health and well-being, and the practical difficulties of attendance and cross-examination were substantial. Special measures under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, sections 23–29, would not provide an adequate solution.

5. General disclosure of X’s personal and medical history would be damaging and serve no useful purpose. Disclosure of her identity and allegations was finely balanced but refused because the health risks were serious, confidentiality could not be controlled, the identity and allegations were inseparable, and disclosure without requiring evidence was unlikely to establish a reliable basis for future arrangements.

6. The unresolved allegation did not automatically require unsupervised contact. Any future order had to be determined by reference to all factors bearing on A’s welfare.

First-instance decision. No appellate history was stated in the judgment.