PG v TW (No.1) (Child: Financial Provision: Legal Funding)

On an application for funding of legal costs within proceedings under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989, the court has a wide discretion to make an order requiring the respondent to fund or contribute to the applicant’s costs. The applicant’s conduct does not automatically justify refusing all further funding. The court may consider the parties’ litigation conduct, procedural choices, failure to comply with directions, absence of realistic proposals and the proportionality of costs. Costs may be assessed broadly, using the respondent’s costs as a benchmark while allowing for differences in the work reasonably required. Active case management and proportionality are relevant to the timing and structure of funding orders.

The mother applied for an order requiring the father to fund her historical and future legal costs in two applications under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989. The applications sought maintenance, a lump sum and secure provision for their child. The father had already paid £35,000 but opposed any further provision, relying principally on the mother’s conduct and the level of her solicitors’ costs.

The court considered the mother’s lack of other effective funding, the parties’ litigation conduct, the father’s failure to comply with directions, related proceedings abroad and the competing costs estimates. The central issue was whether, and to what extent, the court should exercise its discretion to make an A v A order.

1. An order was made. The court exercised its jurisdiction within the Schedule 1 proceedings to require the father to contribute further to the mother’s legal costs. The criteria identified in Currey v Currey (2) [2006] EWCA Civ 1338, [2007] 1 FLR 946 were accepted to be satisfied, including that the mother had no other effective source of funding.
2. The court’s discretion was wide. Criticism of the mother’s presentation of her case did not justify depriving her entirely of further funding. Such criticism was better addressed through realistic proposals, constructive discussion and later costs assessment.
3. The court was entitled to take account of the father’s conduct, including pursuing foreign proceedings, making no proposals beyond maintenance, issuing further procedural applications and failing to comply with a direction to file evidence. These matters formed part of the overall discretionary assessment.
4. In assessing the amount, the court used the father’s costs as a benchmark but allowed for work additionally required on the mother’s side. Given the limited information and competing estimates, a broad-brush assessment was appropriate. The order included £45,000 for historical costs, a contingent allowance of £27,000 for the strike-out and stay applications, and £60,000 towards the costs to trial, payable by instalments.
5. The court emphasised proportionality and active case management under Rules 1.1(2) and 1.4(2) of the Family Procedure Rules 2010. The procedural applications were listed promptly so that they would not obstruct settlement discussions or make the litigation disproportionate.

Not stated in the judgment.