Hunt v North Somerset Council

A local authority’s approval of a budget may involve the exercise of statutory functions concerning youth services where the budget includes reductions which may result in facilities closing. In that event, the authority must take steps to ascertain qualifying young persons’ views and ensure that those views are taken into account. The statutory threshold is modest and does not prescribe a particular consultation method.

The public sector equality duty requires due regard before and during the decision-making process. Its content is fact-sensitive. A formal equality impact assessment is not invariably required, and the assessment need not address every protected characteristic in a formulaic manner. The court determines compliance on the whole evidence, rather than by applying a Wednesbury test.

The claimant, a young person with ADHD and learning difficulties, challenged North Somerset Council’s approval of its 2012/13 revenue budget insofar as it reduced expenditure on youth services. The challenge concerned proposal CYPS-26, under which the Council would reduce direct youth-service provision and might close youth centres as a last resort.

He alleged breaches of section 507B of the Education Act 1996, including the duties concerning young persons’ views, and section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. The central issues were whether the budget decision involved exercising functions under section 507B, whether the Council had taken sufficient steps to ascertain and consider young persons’ views, and whether councillors had due regard to the public sector equality duties.

1. Ground 1 failed. Approval of the revenue budget necessarily involved approval of its component proposals, including CYPS-26. Because that proposal contemplated closure of youth centres as a last resort, the Council was exercising a function under section 507B of the Education Act 1996 and was therefore subject to section 507B(9).
2. Section 507B(9) required the Council to take steps to ascertain qualifying young persons’ views about positive leisure-time activities and facilities, and to ensure that those views were taken into account. It did not require consultation about the financing or identity of the service provider. The statutory phrase “take steps” imposed a modest threshold and did not prescribe a particular method.
3. The Council’s publicity, publication of the draft Medium Term Financial Plan, delivery of North Somerset Life to households, and meetings with youth-club management committees cumulatively constituted steps to ascertain views. More targeted consultation with individual young persons would have been desirable, but was not legally necessary. The absence of further consultation after adoption of the Plan did not invalidate the decision because the period was short and circumstances had not materially changed.
4. The statutory guidance under section 507B allowed considerable flexibility, suggesting consultation, surveys, qualitative research and direct engagement. It did not impose a more onerous obligation than the statutory duty to take steps.
5. Ground 2 failed. The court applied the principles summarised in R (Williams and Dorrington) v Surrey County Council [2012] EWHC 867 (QB). Compliance with section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 was a question for the court on the whole evidence, not a Wednesbury question. The duty was substantive, fact-sensitive, continuing and non-delegable, but did not require a formal equality impact assessment or a formulaic analysis of every protected characteristic.
6. The councillors had access to the relevant equality impact assessments, the summary appendix, consultation material, the alternative budgets and representations made at the meeting. The January 2012 assessment identified a potentially high impact, referred to several protected characteristics, explained the evidential basis and identified mitigation. The court inferred that the councillors familiarised themselves with the available material and concluded that they had sufficient information to have due regard to the statutory duties.
7. The discussion concerning relief was unnecessary to the result. The court considered that a challenge to one budget component would not necessarily be a challenge to a statutory calculation under section 66 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992. The statutory provisions did not require the whole revenue budget and council tax to be recalculated merely because one component was quashed. The claim was dismissed.

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court. No appeal or earlier decision is stated in the judgment.