Glatt, Re

A court interpreting its own order must use objective material, including the reasoned judgment and the circumstances in which the order was made. It may clarify the order but cannot rely on private recollection or vary it retrospectively. A costs cap imposed for a defined period does not extend beyond that period merely because the order remains formally relevant. An application to increase a cap is ordinarily prospective where the order requires prior notice and an opportunity to make representations. A receiver’s entitlement to remuneration after discharge may arise from the receiver’s lien and from CPR 69.7 where the court so directs.

The case concerned the detailed assessment of the former receiver’s remuneration, expenses and disbursements. A costs judge had referred two preliminary issues to Mitting J: whether the order directing assessment limited remuneration to the period before the receiver’s discharge, and whether costs could exceed a court-imposed care-and-maintenance cap.

The court also considered whether the receiver could make a retrospective application to increase the cap, and whether earlier orders restricted the assets from which remuneration could be recovered.

1. Interpretation of the assessment order. The formal order had to be construed objectively by reference to the reasoned judgment and the material before the court when the order was made. The judge could clarify the order on referral from the costs judge, but could not use his memory of intention where no objective material supported it, or amend the order by hindsight.
2. The order directing assessment of the former receiver’s remuneration, expenses and disbursements under CPR 69.7(4) and CPR 69.7(5) covered work undertaken both before and after discharge. The earlier judgment and the parties’ submissions showed that both periods were within the intended scope.
3. Care-and-maintenance cap. The cap in the order of Munby J was intended to operate while the receivership was on a care-and-maintenance basis pending determination of the defendant’s appeals. It did not govern remuneration after the confiscation appeal concluded or after discharge.
4. The order contemplated applications to increase the cap prospectively. Although it contained no express prohibition on retrospective applications, its wording, notice requirements and opportunity for representations meant that a retrospective application should not be entertained. The receiver’s reluctance to incur the modest cost of a prospective application did not justify depriving the defendant and intervenors of the opportunity to object in advance.
5. The earlier order allowing remuneration in accordance with the appointment letter did not limit recovery to money received during the receivership. The receiver’s lien and CPR 69.7 supported remuneration after discharge where directed by the court.
6. Permission to appeal was refused. The receiver was awarded the costs of litigating the two preliminary issues, including remuneration.

The judgment was a first-instance determination of issues referred by the costs judge during the detailed assessment of the former receiver’s remuneration and costs. The judgment also recorded that an earlier ruling on the receiver’s lien had been upheld by the Court of Appeal, but the citation was not stated.