A Council v M & Ors (Judgment 3: Reporting Restrictions)

Applications to restrict reporting of criminal proceedings require an intense, fact-specific comparison of the competing rights under Articles 8 and 10. Neither right has presumptive priority. An order preventing identification of a criminal defendant may be made only where circumstances are exceptional and the restriction is an absolute necessity. In a sufficiently unusual case, protecting vulnerable children and a young adult may outweigh the public interest in naming the defendant, provided that anonymised reporting of the trial and wider issues remains possible. The order should last no longer than necessary.

A local authority sought a reporting restriction order preventing identification of family members in connection with care proceedings and the mother’s pending criminal trial. The application was broadly supported by the family members and opposed by three national media organisations. The dispute concerned the scope and duration of the order, particularly whether it should prevent publication of the defendant mother’s name in reports of the criminal proceedings.

The court considered the likely identification and harm to the children and a vulnerable young adult, the public interest in open justice, the statutory powers available to the Crown Court, and the competing rights under Articles 8 and 10.

1. Application granted. The court made a reporting restriction order preventing publication of information likely to identify the family members, including the mother’s name in reports of her criminal trial, until the youngest child’s eighteenth birthday in 2029, subject to liberty to apply.
2. Articles 8 and 10 required parallel analysis and an intense focus on the specific rights asserted in the individual case. Neither Convention right had presumptive priority. Restricting identification of a defendant required exceptional circumstances and absolute necessity.
3. The court considered less restrictive alternatives. The powers under section 39(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 and section 46 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 were insufficient in this case.
4. There was a substantial likelihood that naming the mother and publishing her picture would identify the younger family members locally. The likely harm to the children and to A was exceptional, profound and long-lasting.
5. The interference with Article 10 was partial. The order did not prevent reporting of the criminal trial or wider matters of public interest, provided the family could not thereby be identified.
6. The duration had to be as short as was consistent with the order’s purpose. Liberty to apply was preserved.

First instance decision. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.