Klimeto, R (On the Application Of) v City of Westminster Magistrates Court

Section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 does not apply directly to extradition proceedings. Nor is it imported generally through the provisions of the Extradition Act 2003 which confer magistrates’ court powers at particular stages.

Section 7(6) of the 2003 Act applies only during the initial hearing. It cannot be used after that stage to reopen or rescind an extradition order. The 2003 Act establishes a self-contained procedure with strict stages and time limits, which would be undermined by a general power to reopen completed proceedings.

The claimant had consented to extradition to Latvia under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003. The district judge made an extradition order under section 46. It later emerged that the claimant was subject to a domestic criminal charge which had not been brought to the judge’s attention.

The judge purported to use section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 to rescind the extradition order, set aside the claimant’s consent and adjourn the extradition proceedings under section 8A of the 2003 Act. The issue was whether section 142 applied directly or was incorporated through section 7(6) of the 2003 Act.

1. The Divisional Court quashed the district judge’s later order. The extradition order made under section 46 of the Extradition Act 2003 was reinstated.

2. Section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 was directed to orders made when dealing with an offender, in the context of conviction, admission of guilt or sentencing. The claimant was an alleged offender in respect of the Latvian allegations, not an offender within section 142(1). Section 150(5), which extended “offence” to include “alleged offence”, did not extend the separate term “offender” to include “alleged offender”. Section 142 therefore did not apply directly to extradition proceedings.

3. The powers imported by sections 9(1) and 77(1) of the 2003 Act relate to the extradition hearing. No extradition hearing had begun when the claimant consented to extradition, so those provisions could not assist.

4. Section 7(6) concerns the initial hearing only. The relevant proceedings are those dealing with matters under section 7, including service of the warrant, the claimant’s prompt production, identity and the steps required by section 8. The power has no continuing operation after those matters have been completed. The structure of Part 2, where section 77(1) expressly applies only at the extradition hearing, reinforced that conclusion.

5. More fundamentally, the 2003 Act provides a self-contained extradition code with strict time limits for each procedural stage and for appeals. A general ability to invoke section 142 after a hearing, or after the time for appeal had expired, would remove those limits and was inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

6. The court also observed that the procedural problem considered in R (Janis Berners) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court might have been addressed while the judge remained seized of the case, without resort to section 142.

This was a judicial review claim before the Divisional Court of the Administrative Court. The court quashed the district judge’s order of 16 April 2012 and reinstated the extradition order made on 4 April 2012.