General Medical Council v Gill

Interim suspension may properly continue where serious allegations justify protection of patients and the public pending a Fitness to Practise Panel hearing. The court must nevertheless balance that protection against the doctor’s interests and the public law requirement that regulatory investigations proceed expeditiously. An extension should be limited to the period justified by the evidence and may be accompanied by active case-management directions. When seeking an extension in circumstances comparable to a without-notice application, the regulator owes the court a duty of frankness and must disclose relevant criticisms, delays and explanations.

The General Medical Council sought a further extension under section 41A(6) and (7) of the Medical Act of an interim order suspending Dr Bhavdip Gill. The order had originally been made on 19 March 2010, and a previous application had resulted in a nine-month extension after the court criticised the GMC’s leisurely investigation: [2011] EWHC 2645 (Admin).

The GMC sought a further 12-month extension. The court considered whether continuation of suspension remained justified, how the investigation’s delay affected the appropriate duration of any extension, and whether the supporting evidence adequately disclosed the history of the earlier proceedings.

1. Continuation justified. Applying the principles identified by the Court of Appeal in Huew [2007] EWCA Civ 369, the court remained satisfied that the Interim Orders Panel had been right to suspend the doctor and that suspension should continue until the case could be brought before a Fitness to Practise Panel.
2. Delay and proportionality. The GMC had allowed substantial periods to elapse without adequate explanation, despite the court’s earlier criticisms and an anticipated timetable. Protection of patients and the public remained important, but the doctor’s right to answer the allegations before a tribunal, earn a living and avoid deskilling also required weight. A 12-month extension was therefore unjustified; the suspension was extended for six months only.
3. Duty of frankness. Applications of this kind, commonly heard without the doctor’s attendance, engage a duty of frankness substantially analogous to that on a without-notice application. The GMC had to place before the court all relevant information, including the earlier judgment, its criticisms and reasons why anticipated investigative steps had not been completed.
4. Active management. Future extension applications concerning Dr Gill were reserved to the judge. Any such application had to explain fully why the case had not yet been brought before a Fitness to Practise Panel.
5. The order was made in those restricted terms. Costs were allowed as sought, subject to limiting work on documents to three hours.

The judgment records a previous application before the same court, determined on 13 September 2011, which resulted in a nine-month extension and was reported as [2011] EWHC 2645 (Admin). The present application was granted only to the restricted extent stated.