Leeds United Football Club Ltd v The Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police

Police authorities may charge for special police services only where the services are requested and extend beyond the ordinary common-law duty to keep the peace. Crowd control on public highways or land not owned, leased or controlled by an event organiser ordinarily remains ordinary policing, even where the event caused the demand, benefited the organiser, was commercial, or required exceptional resources. There is no general “footprint”, “but for” or ex post facto benefit test. A club may be charged for qualifying services on land it owns, leases or controls. Safety-certificate conditions may regulate attendance, alcohol and timing, but cannot transfer the cost of non-qualifying external policing. Qualifying charges may include indirect costs and may be challenged only if irrational in the public-law sense.

Leeds United Football Club Ltd challenged West Yorkshire Police’s attempt to recover the costs of public-order policing within a defined “footprint” around Elland Road Stadium. The footprint included public highways and parking areas owned or controlled by third parties. The Club accepted liability for special police services within the stadium and on land owned, leased or controlled by it, but disputed liability for external policing.

The central issues were whether the policing was “special police services” under section 25(1) of the Police Act 1996, whether the Club had requested those services, and whether the earlier Wigan Athletic decision supported recovery beyond Club-controlled land.

1. Interpretation of section 25. Section 25(1) of the Police Act 1996 permits charges for special police services provided at the request of a person. It does not permit recovery for the discharge of the ordinary common-law duty to keep the peace, prevent crime and protect the public.
2. External policing. The policing of rival supporters on public highways and third-party land was undertaken to maintain public order and protect members of the public, including local residents and well-behaved supporters. The Club had made no express or implied request for those services and did not own, lease or control the relevant areas. They were therefore not special police services.
3. The fact that the matches caused the expenditure, primarily benefited the Club, were commercially conducted, or imposed an exceptional strain on police resources did not alter that conclusion. There was no general “but for” or benefit test. The “footprint” approach had no statutory basis and could not extend liability beyond land owned, leased or controlled by the Club.
4. The reasoning in Glasbrook Bros Ltd v Glamorgan County Council, Harris v Sheffield United Football Club Ltd, West Yorkshire Police Authority v Reading Festival Ltd and Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v Wigan Athletic AFC Ltd supported that conclusion. In particular, Wigan Athletic did not establish a general power to charge for policing on a surrounding footprint.
5. Safety certificates under the Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 could impose conditions concerning attendance numbers, alcohol and kick-off times. They could not require the Club to contribute to external services which did not qualify as special police services.
6. The Club was entitled to repayment of sums paid without prejudice for external services during the relevant seasons. Qualifying charges could include indirect costs and six-hour charging units, subject only to public-law irrationality. Submissions on the precise form of declaration were reserved.