Morris, R (On the Application Of) v Preston Crown Court & Anor

A hackney-carriage byelaw prohibiting driving so as to expose persons to risk of injury may regulate the manner in which the carriage is driven, as well as the condition of an animal harnessed to it. The words must be construed in their statutory context and given their ordinary meaning. A construction which makes express words redundant or creates an irrational gap should be rejected. The existence of general road-traffic offences does not prevent a specific local regulatory scheme from prohibiting overlapping conduct.

The claimant was convicted by the Fylde Justices under byelaw 20 of the Blackpool Hackney Carriage Byelaws 1979 after allegedly driving a horse-drawn hackney carriage through a red light and into oncoming traffic. The Preston Crown Court dismissed his appeal, holding that the byelaw could apply to the manner of driving. On judicial review, the claimant argued that byelaw 20 concerned only the condition and use of the horse and equipment. The central issue was the proper construction of the words “drive or allow to be driven”.

1. Statutory power. Section 68 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 empowered the Council to make byelaws regulating the conduct of hackney-carriage proprietors and drivers. Driving a hackney carriage fell within that power.
2. Construction of byelaw 20. The determinative question was the object of the transitive verb “drive”. In context, driving ordinarily and naturally meant driving the carriage, not merely driving the horse. The claimant’s construction would make “drive or allow to be driven” redundant, because a horse must be harnessed before it can be driven. It could also create an irrational gap where a horse became dangerous after harnessing but before being driven.
3. Byelaw 20 therefore created two relevant modes of offending: driving the carriage, or allowing it to be driven, so as to expose persons to risk of injury; and harnessing an animal, or allowing it to be harnessed, in a condition creating that risk. The marginal note and the wording of other byelaws supported, but were not necessary to, that construction.
4. The possibility that the same driving conduct might breach general road-traffic legislation did not prevent the specific hackney-carriage scheme from applying.
5. The Crown Court had not erred in law. The judicial review application was refused.

1. Preston Crown Court: dismissed the claimant’s appeal against conviction and held that byelaw 20 could apply to the manner in which a hackney carriage was driven.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): refused judicial review and upheld the Crown Court’s construction.