EWQ v GFD

An interim privacy injunction may restrain disclosure of private information where publication is likely to interfere unjustifiably with the claimant’s private and family life. The fact that some people already know of a relationship does not necessarily remove the claimant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly where wider publication would cause intrusion or distress.

The court must balance Articles 8 and 10 rights. A purpose of coercing financial support or benefits without an apparent legitimate claim is likely to attract little protection under Article 10. Alleged assistance to a spouse’s deception is relevant but not decisive. Repeated threats to visit a person’s home or office may amount to harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

The claimant sought continuation of an interim injunction restraining the defendant from publishing private information and harassing him. The parties had previously had a sexual relationship. The defendant had made repeated demands for money and threatened disclosure to the claimant’s wife, business associates and the media.

The defendant challenged the injunction, relying on alleged material non-disclosure, the extent to which the relationship was already known, the absence of evidence that all pleaded details would be disclosed, and the possible effect of the injunction in assisting deception of the claimant’s wife. The issues were whether the claimant was likely to establish that publication should not be allowed and whether wider restraints against harassment were justified.

1. Interim privacy relief. The claimant was likely to establish that publication of details of his sexual relationship with the defendant, his relationship with his wife and children, and other alleged sexual relationships should not be allowed. The threats were sufficiently broad to justify protection beyond the bare fact of the relationships.
2. Privacy and prior knowledge. The court could not determine on conflicting witness statements how many people knew of the relationship. Limited prior knowledge did not, however, establish that wider publication would be permissible. Intrusion and the difference between disclosure to a limited circle and publication to the press remained material.
3. Family life and deception. The possibility that an injunction might assist deception of a spouse was a relevant consideration, but it was not a rule barring relief. The court had to assess the extent and harmful effect of the deception in the circumstances. Here, the likely purpose of disclosure was to humiliate the claimant’s wife, weaken the marriage and exert pressure for payment. The injunction’s primary purpose was therefore to restrain likely interference with the claimant’s and his family’s private and family life.
4. Article 10. Expression intended to coerce financial support or benefits where the defendant had no legitimate claim was likely to attract little protection. The defendant’s Article 10 rights could be restricted under Article 10(2) for protection of the rights of the claimant and his family. The court recognised that a person might nevertheless have a right or duty to disclose information to the police, a regulator or another person with a legal or moral interest in receiving it.
5. Harassment. Repeated threats to visit the claimant’s home and office, without a reasonable explanation, amounted on the interim evidence to harassment under section 1 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. The imprecision of the threats justified both specific restraints and a general restraint against pursuing a course of conduct amounting to harassment.
6. Non-disclosure. Although the claimant had not shown that the relationship was known only to the small group he initially identified, the difference in the parties’ evidence was not material. It would not have affected continuation of the injunction. The injunction was continued, with a friends-and-family provision included.

The judgment records earlier without-notice and return-date hearings in the same proceedings. An interim injunction was granted on 29 June 2012 and continued pending the defendant’s application heard on 23 July 2012. No appeal is stated.