AA (A child), Re

[2012] EWHC 2647 (Fam)

Case details

Case citations
[2012] EWHC 2647 (Fam)
Court
High Court (Family Division)
Judgment date
29 June 2012
Judgment text

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Subjects
Family Child protection Fact-finding and causation
Keywords
care proceedings Children Act 1989 section 31 burden and standard of proof balance of probabilities unknown cause of death expert evidence medical evidence smothering neglect fact-finding
Outcome
issues determined
Judicial consideration

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Summary

In care proceedings, the local authority bears the burden of proving the facts relied on for the threshold criteria. Allegations of serious harm, including responsibility for a child’s death, must be proved on the balance of probabilities. The court must decide whether the alleged fact occurred and cannot treat an unproved allegation as a possibility supporting future welfare decisions.

Findings must be based on evidence and properly drawn inferences, not suspicion or speculation. Medical and expert evidence must be assessed with the whole evidential picture. The possibility of an unknown natural cause must be considered where the medical evidence does not establish causation. The exclusion of known causes does not, without more, prove deliberate harm.

Factual background

The local authority brought care proceedings concerning a surviving child after her two brothers died suddenly while in their mother’s care. It sought findings that the mother had seriously neglected the children and had caused the boys’ deaths by asphyxiation. The proceedings were transferred to the High Court for a fact-finding hearing.

The court considered extensive factual, medical, pathological, genetic and cardiac evidence. The central issues were whether the mother had neglected the children and whether the local authority had proved, on the balance of probabilities, that she had smothered either boy.

Held

  1. Burden and standard of proof. The local authority bore the burden of proving the allegations. Under Children Act 1989, section 31(2), the threshold depended on proof of significant harm or likely significant harm attributable to the care given or likely to be given. The standard was the balance of probabilities. The court had to decide whether the alleged events occurred and could not base decisions on a finding that they might have occurred.
  2. Evidence and expert opinion. Findings of fact had to be based on evidence and properly drawn inferences rather than suspicion or speculation. The court was required to assess the evidence on the wider canvas and avoid evaluating individual items in isolation. Expert medical evidence was important but the court remained responsible for the final evaluation of all the evidence. Each expert had to remain within the limits of his or her expertise.
  3. Unknown causation. The absence of an identified natural cause did not establish deliberate harm. The possibility of an unknown cause had to be factored into the assessment where the medical evidence did not establish the proposed aetiology. That possibility affected the evaluation of causation but did not alter the burden or standard of proof.
  4. Application to the deaths. The court found that the petechiae observed on B were probably absent on hospital admission, were not in a typical distribution for asphyxiation and were non-specific. The evidence otherwise showed no injuries or clinical signs sufficiently supporting smothering. The mother’s largely consistent accounts, her reaction to the collapses, the absence of evidence of fear by J, and the implausibility of the proposed timing and mechanism weakened the local authority’s case. The court therefore found that the local authority had not proved that the mother smothered either boy.
  5. Neglect and order. The mother had nevertheless committed serious and chronic neglect, including inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, inappropriate feeding and chastisement, and failure to protect J from further contact with GM despite an allegation of sexual misconduct. The threshold under section 31 was therefore satisfied on the basis of neglect. The court directed that the proceedings should proceed on the basis that the mother had not smothered the boys.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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