Thomas & Anor v Merthyr Tydfil Car Auction Ltd

Private nuisance is assessed by asking whether the interference is sufficiently serious, viewed in all the circumstances. Relevant considerations include the character of the locality, the frequency and duration of the interference, and the standards of the ordinary person. Planning permission does not authorise the commission of a nuisance, although its implementation may alter the character of the locality. Liability therefore depends on the manner in which the permitted activity is conducted and its effect on neighbouring land.

The claimants, who lived near the defendant’s vehicle auction business, sought damages for alleged nuisance during the six years before proceedings were issued. They complained principally of vehicle noise and, additionally, fumes from the defendant’s lower yard. The defendant denied nuisance and relied on compliance with planning permission.

The court considered whether the noise and fumes amounted to an undue interference with the claimants’ comfortable and convenient enjoyment of their home, having regard to the locality, duration and frequency of the alleged interference.

1. The claim succeeded in part. The claimants were awarded £9,000 in general damages for noise nuisance during the six-year period before issue of the proceedings.
2. The applicable principles were those stated in Barr v Biffa Waste Services Ltd [2012] 3 AER 380. There is no absolute standard. The question is one of degree, determined by all the circumstances. The court must consider whether there was a real interference with ordinary residential comfort, the character of the locality, and the duration of the interference.
3. The defendant could not rely on the planning permission as legal authorisation for activities conducted so as to constitute a nuisance. Applying Lawrence and another v Fen Tigers Ltd & Others [2012] 3 AER 169, planning permission might change the character of the locality, but it did not do so here. The locality remained mainly residential, although nearby business uses and road traffic meant that residents could not expect complete silence.
4. The claimants’ records and supporting evidence established that vehicle revving, idling, high-impact bangs and crashes, and related noise from the lower yard occurred with sufficient frequency and intensity to constitute a nuisance. Dog barking from the defendant’s premises materially worsened the nuisance in the approximately 18 months before proceedings.
5. The evidence of fumes established occasional emissions, but they were too infrequent and short-lived to amount to an actionable nuisance. There was also no reliable evidence of any harmful effect on the claimants’ health.
6. The claimants accepted that the nuisance had ceased shortly after proceedings began. Provided the defendant continued its current practices, the court considered that it would be committing no tort.