Lyon, R (on the application of) v Cambridge City Council & Anor

A planning authority’s classification of development under the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011 involves statutory interpretation where the meaning of the relevant expression is concerned, but factual application may be reviewed only on ordinary rationality grounds. A small replacement sports pavilion was not an urban development project within Schedule 2 paragraph 10(b).

Planning committees may disagree with officers and impose lawful conditions after considering representations. A condition must fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted development and cannot be used merely to remedy pre-existing deficiencies. Strike-out is a discretionary and proportionate remedy, requiring consideration of the overriding objective and alternatives.

The claimant challenged Cambridge City Council’s grant of planning permission for the demolition and replacement of a sports pavilion at Hills Road Sixth Form College. He sought permission to apply for judicial review on grounds concerning environmental impact assessment, alleged loss of a playing pitch, intensification of use, consultation, planning conditions and a travel plan.

The interested party applied to strike out the claim under CPR 3.4(2), relying on procedural non-compliance, alleged absence of reasonable grounds and abuse of process. The applications for permission and strike-out were listed together.

1. Permission to apply for judicial review dismissed. The proposed demolition and replacement of the pavilion was not an urban development project under Schedule 2 paragraph 10(b) of the Town and Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2011. The expression required consideration of the statutory meaning of the relevant terms, while the application of that meaning to the facts was reviewable on ordinary Wednesbury grounds. The authority was also entitled to conclude that significant environmental effects were unlikely and that the relevant development area did not exceed 0.5 hectares, so no arguable EIA ground arose (paras 33–45).
2. The authority had not been misled when consulting Sport England. It was entitled to accept the evidence that the alleged additional training pitch was temporary, had ceased to be used before the application, and was not lost as a consequence of the development (paras 46–49).
3. Intensification, access and traffic issues had been considered repeatedly by officers, the highways authority, the Development Control Forum and the South Area Committee. The conclusion that the proposal would not materially intensify use or significantly worsen existing access problems was a planning judgment open to the authority. The authority had also considered, lawfully, whether to impose a Grampian condition, a planning obligation or conditions addressing the existing southern access. Such measures could not be imposed merely to remedy pre-existing deficiencies unrelated to the development (paras 50–67).
4. The Committee was entitled to impose a travel-plan condition despite the officer’s contrary recommendation. There was no inconsistency between finding that the development would not intensify use and requiring sustainable travel measures. The prior consultation on access and intensification was sufficient (paras 68–72).
5. The strike-out application was refused. Applying the approach in Asiansky Television plc v Bayer Rosin [2001] EWCA Civ 1792, the court considered the circumstances, proportionality, the overriding objective and alternatives to striking out. Any technical non-compliance had caused no material prejudice, and the statement of case disclosed arguable grounds and did not abuse the process (paras 73–82).

The judgment does not state any appeal from this decision. The applications had been directed to be heard together by McCombe J on 13 June 2012.