HM Attorney General v Harold Singer (aka Harry Singer)

For the purposes of a section 42 order, a specialist tribunal is an inferior court where it exercises judicial power by determining disputes between private parties and has a statutory relationship with the ordinary courts. The statutory threshold is met where a person has habitually and persistently, without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious proceedings or made vexatious applications. The court must assess the whole picture and cumulative effect of the litigation, including successful claims, repetitive appeals and the impact on other parties and the administration of justice. An all proceedings order is protective rather than punitive. It operates as a filter, requiring permission for future proceedings while preserving access to the courts for proper claims.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 for all proceedings orders against Harold Singer and June Singer. The orders were sought because of extensive litigation arising from a long-running residential service charge dispute, including proceedings in Leasehold Valuation Tribunals, county courts and magistrates’ courts.

The principal issues were whether the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal was a court for section 42 purposes and whether the Singers’ conduct satisfied the statutory test for an all proceedings order.

1. All proceedings orders granted. The court made all proceedings orders against both respondents. The orders were not findings of contempt or punishment. They required the respondents to obtain permission from the High Court before instituting or continuing civil or criminal proceedings.
2. The Leasehold Valuation Tribunal was an inferior court for section 42 purposes. Its function was to determine disputes between private parties concerning proprietary and contractual rights, including liability for service charges. Its jurisdiction and procedures were judicial in character, and the statutory scheme permitted transfers between the ordinary courts and the Tribunal.
3. The statutory threshold was satisfied. The court considered the litigation as a whole, whether or not the Tribunal proceedings were included. The number and repetitive nature of the claims, their limited legal basis, routine appeals, repeated arguments and continuing activity demonstrated habitual and persistent vexatious litigation without reasonable ground.
4. Previous success in some Tribunal matters did not prevent the litigation, viewed cumulatively, from being vexatious. The court applied the approach in Attorney General v Barker and considered the overall effect on the opposing parties and the administration of justice, consistently with Attorney General v Ford and Attorney General v Covey.
5. The order was protective. Its purpose was to prevent hopeless applications being repeatedly brought, while preserving the respondents’ ability to obtain permission for proper proceedings and to protect legitimate rights.

First-instance application in the Administrative Court. No prior appellate decision was stated in the judgment.