Tajik, R (on the application of) v The City of Westminster Magistrates' Court & Ors

Under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003, the statutory period for surrender begins when the relevant appellate decision becomes final. A later extra-statutory review of new medical evidence does not postpone the operation of section 118. If surrender does not occur within the required period, the requested person must be discharged unless reasonable cause for the delay is shown. The court must examine all the circumstances, including the reason for delay and its impact on the requested person. Unexplained delay by a requesting state is not reasonable cause merely because it may benefit the requested person. Section 118(7) focuses on justification for delay, rather than whether delay has caused oppression or injustice.

The claimant had been committed for extradition to the United States under Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003. His statutory appeal was dismissed on 10 April 2008, and certification of a point of law was refused on 14 May 2008.

After receiving further medical evidence, the Secretary of State undertook an extra-statutory review under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. She delayed making a decision while diplomatic efforts were made to establish whether the United States would withdraw its request. The claimant sought discharge under section 118(7), re-opening of the statutory appeal, and judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision. The central issue was whether section 118 had been triggered and whether reasonable cause had been shown for the delay.

1. Section 118 was engaged. The 28-day period began when the High Court refused certification of a point of law on 14 May 2008. The Act contains no exception postponing that period while the Secretary of State undertakes an extra-statutory medical or human-rights review.
2. Reasonable cause. Time reasonably required to consider new medical evidence constituted reasonable cause. Asking the United States whether it would withdraw its request was justified for a short period. Its unexplained failure to respond for more than two years did not constitute reasonable cause. The statutory scheme did not permit either state to choose when surrender should occur without explaining the delay to the court.
3. The fact that delay allowed the claimant to remain in the United Kingdom did not determine whether the cause was reasonable. The court had to assess all the circumstances, including the claimant’s interests.
4. Re-opening under CPR 52.17 was unnecessary because section 118(7) supplied the appropriate means of avoiding real injustice. Observations concerning section 91, Convention rights, and oppression under section 82 were obiter. The medical evidence did not disclose a condition sufficiently severe to engage Articles 2 or 3, and the passage of time would not, without more, have made extradition oppressive under section 82.
5. The District Judge’s decision was quashed. A mandatory order required him to order the claimant’s discharge under section 118(7).

The claimant’s statutory extradition appeals were rejected by the Divisional Court on 10 April 2008: [2008] EWHC 666. Certification of a point of law was refused on 14 May 2008. The present court quashed the District Judge’s refusal of discharge and ordered discharge under section 118(7) of the Extradition Act 2003.