Ahmed, R (On the Application Of) v York Magistrates' Court & Anor

A warrant application under the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 must comply with the statutory particulars, but need not set out every fact or item of evidence relied upon. The magistrate must personally be satisfied that the statutory conditions are met; an applicant’s assertion alone is insufficient. That satisfaction may be based on sworn oral evidence, provided the material basis is adequately recorded. Regulation 24 is independent of regulation 23 and permits warrants for premises used only as a dwelling. A warrant may authorise seizure where its wording, read fairly, does so. The warrant and search were therefore lawful.

The claimant challenged a warrant issued by York Magistrates’ Court under regulation 24 of the Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008. The warrant authorised officers of City of York Council to enter, search and seize documents and electronic equipment from the claimant’s apartment. The claimant sought to quash the warrant, declarations, return of the seized items and damages.

He argued that regulation 24 did not extend to dwellings, that there had been material non-disclosure, that the written information was insufficient, that the magistrates could not have been satisfied that the statutory conditions were met, and that the warrant did not authorise seizure. The central issues were the statutory requirements for the application and warrant, the evidence which the magistrates could consider, and the lawfulness of execution.

1. The claim was dismissed. The warrant was valid and the entry, search and seizure were lawful.

2. The statutory scheme was comprehensive and self-contained as to the matters an applicant must state and a warrant must specify. Sections 15 and 16 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 supplied the relevant safeguards. The scheme did not require the written information to contain every fact or item of evidence relied upon.

3. A warrant to search and seize is a serious infringement of liberty and is never a formality. The magistrate must personally be satisfied that each statutory condition, including any requirement for reasonable grounds, is met. The applicant’s assertion that the conditions are satisfied is not enough.

4. Regulation 23 permitted entry without a warrant in specified circumstances, but excluded premises used only as a dwelling. Regulation 24 operated independently and expressly applied to any premises, including dwellings. The court followed R (Helidon Vuciterni Alsat Limited) v Brent Magistrates’ Court, [2012] EWCA 2140 (Admin), on that construction.

5. The magistrates were entitled to consider sworn oral evidence in addition to the written information. A contemporaneous note of such evidence was good practice but was not a mandatory statutory requirement. On the evidence, the magistrates had sufficient material to be satisfied that condition A and condition D under regulation 24 were met.

6. The wording of the warrant’s reference to evidence that inspection “may” disclose a breach did not establish that the magistrate had applied the wrong statutory test of likelihood. The accepted evidence showed that the correct test had been explained and applied. The warrant also sufficiently identified the basis of condition D.

7. The warrant expressly authorised entry, search and seizure. The court was bound by, and independently accepted, the reasoning in Helidon that the warrant included a power to seize. The alternative powers under regulation 23 and section 19 of PACE therefore did not alter the result.