Hancock v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government

An enforcement notice must require no more than is necessary to remedy the breach of planning control or injury to amenity, while preserving existing lawful uses. A planning permission for uses does not authorise operational development or create a continuing right to have buildings on land after those buildings have been demolished. Once existing buildings are voluntarily demolished, planning permission is required for their replacement, whether identical or different. The adequacy of an inspector’s reasons depends on the nature of the issues, but brief reasons may suffice where the principal legal and factual issues are clear and the outcome is inevitable. Enforcement notice requirements are sufficiently specific where the recipient and all parties understand what buildings must be removed and no actual compliance difficulty is evidenced.

The appellant challenged under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 an inspector’s dismissal of appeals concerning replacement light industrial units in the Green Belt. The appeals included a section 78 planning appeal, a section 174 ground (a) appeal, a deemed application under section 177(5), and a section 174 ground (f) appeal against the extent of the enforcement steps.

The appellant accepted that the replacement buildings required permission, but argued that the enforcement notice unlawfully removed lawful rights associated with the former buildings and was insufficiently precise. The central issues were whether the notice protected an existing lawful use and whether its requirements were adequately reasoned and specific.

1. Appeal dismissed. The inspector’s decision was not unlawful. The appellant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of £8,715 within 28 days. Permission to appeal was refused.

2. The principle in Mansi v Elstree RDC [1964] 16 P&CR 153, followed in John Kennelly Sales v Secretary of State for the Environment [1994] 1 PLR 10 and Duguid v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 82 P&CR 6, is that enforcement steps must not exceed what is necessary to remedy the breach and must preserve existing lawful uses.

3. The 1993 permission authorised specified uses, but did not authorise the construction of buildings. Its condition concerning repair and maintenance applied to buildings existing on the site; it did not confer a right to erect or retain buildings. Following Sainty v Minister of Housing and Local Government (1964) 15 P & CR 432, once the appellant demolished the original units, planning permission was required to re-erect them or construct different buildings. No right to have buildings on that part of the land therefore required protection.

4. The inspector adequately addressed the fallback argument. His brief reference to the appellant’s decision to demolish the original buildings was sufficient in context. Even if fuller reasons had been required, the outcome could not have differed because the asserted fallback position did not exist.

5. The approach to reasons in South Buckinghamshire DC v Porter [2004] 1 WLR was satisfied. The inspector addressed the main issues and disclosed why the ground (f) appeal failed. The enforcement notice was also sufficiently specific: the buildings marked on the plan were understood by all parties, and no evidence showed any practical uncertainty about compliance.

The judgment does not state any earlier appellate decision. It concerns a statutory challenge under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to the Secretary of State’s inspector’s decision dated 15 January 2010.