Pitblado & Ors v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

In an enforcement appeal concerning the period allowed for compliance, an inspector conducting an informal hearing must investigate sufficiently to resolve evidential conflicts, but an appellant who is professionally represented remains responsible for presenting the case fully. The inspector need not prompt the appellant to supply evidence or convert the hearing into an inquiry. A procedural challenge requires unfairness causing material prejudice. An inspector may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and the absence of evidence when deciding what weight to give assertions about hardship, litigation or the parties’ knowledge. The court may refuse relief even where an error is established if remittal would serve no practical purpose and the underlying objective has already been achieved.

The appellants challenged enforcement notices issued by Dacorum Borough Council concerning unauthorised dwellings and associated works. An inspector allowed some appeals but dismissed the appeals relating to Gable End and Birch Cottage, including appeals under ground (g), which concerned the period for compliance.

The appellants argued that the informal hearing was procedurally unfair because the inspector considered their knowledge of the planning position without adequate notice or opportunity to respond. They also argued that he failed to take account of their efforts to discover whether planning permission existed. The central issues were whether the procedure was unfair or prejudicial and whether the inspector failed to consider a material matter.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The inspector’s procedure was neither unfair nor prejudicial. The appellants’ ground (g) case relied on proposed litigation against their conveyancing solicitors, their alleged good faith, and the resulting hardship. The relevance of their knowledge of the planning status of the properties was therefore inherent in the case they had chosen to present.

2. An informal hearing is essentially inquisitorial, and an inspector has an enhanced role in resolving conflicts of evidence. However, that duty does not relieve a professionally represented appellant of the responsibility to put the case fully. The inspector was entitled to rely on the appellants’ planning consultant, was not required to prompt him to call evidence, and was not obliged to invite the appellants to attend or to recommend a public inquiry. The opportunity given to Mr Pitblado to speak at the site visit went beyond what fairness required.

3. The inspector’s decision letter made clear that he was not finding dishonesty or bad faith. He was entitled to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellants had known or tried to establish whether planning permission had been sought or obtained, and to attach little weight to the proposed litigation and tenancy arrangements. The solicitor’s invoice, even if produced, would only have evidenced searches; it would not have shown their result or what the appellants had been told.

4. The one-year compliance period gave ample time for demolition and removal works. The court found no failure to take a material consideration into account and no error of law in the inspector’s reasoning.

5. Alternatively, relief would have been refused in the court’s discretion. Remitting the ground (g) appeals would have been disproportionate and pointless, since the relevant period had substantially elapsed and the appellants had already obtained more time than sought by some of them.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appellants brought an appeal under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against the inspector’s decision on enforcement notice appeals. The appeal was dismissed.