Thursfield v Thursfield

The court may grant a mandatory injunction requiring information and disclosure where this is reasonably ancillary to making earlier orders effective. The jurisdiction under Senior Courts Act 1981, section 37, is not confined by technical notions of document control. The relevant question is whether the defendant can provide, or will be able to provide, the information and documents sought. Third-party privacy may justify caution, but it does not prevent disclosure where the intrusion is necessary to secure compliance with effective court orders. A decision concerning control for the purposes of the Civil Procedure Rules may be distinguished where the present application is based on the court’s injunctive jurisdiction.

The claimant sought disclosure concerning the David Thursfield Family Trust. She was not a beneficiary, but alleged that the trust might hold assets formerly belonging to the defendant and might have been established to defeat her matrimonial claims. She also sought to enforce a judgment obtained in Michigan.

The court had previously made freezing and disclosure orders. The defendant had failed to comply fully and had been found guilty of contempt. The central issue was whether further disclosure concerning the trust could properly be ordered to make the earlier orders effective, despite the claimant’s lack of an English judgment and the defendant’s objections based on privacy and control.

1. The application was granted, subject to arguments concerning timing and precise wording. Further disclosure concerning the family trust was reasonably ancillary to the earlier disclosure orders, which had not been properly complied with.

2. The court possessed jurisdiction under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to grant a mandatory injunction requiring information and disclosure. The jurisdiction was not dependent on technical notions of control applicable to particular procedural rules.

3. The relevant question was whether the defendant could in fact provide the information and documents, or would be able to provide them. The court was satisfied that he could and would be able to do so. Evidence that he exercised de facto control over the trustee company’s affairs also supported the order, although technical control of the documents was not a pre-condition.

4. North Shore Ventures Ltd v Anstead Holdings Inc [2012] EWCA Civ 11 concerned disclosure based on control for the purposes of CPR 71.2 and CPR 38.1. The claimant’s status and the procedural basis differed materially. The decision was therefore distinguishable and did not constrain the wider injunctive jurisdiction exercised here.

5. Privacy concerns were real but did not outweigh the need for disclosure. In the circumstances, intrusion into third-party privacy was necessary to ensure that the court’s previous orders were effective.

The judgment records that earlier freezing and disclosure orders were continued on 6 December 2011. The defendant appealed, but the appeal was ultimately unsuccessful because he failed to provide the security required by the Court of Appeal. The citation of that appellate decision is not stated.