National Union of Mineworkers v Scargill

A union body with constitutional responsibility for substantial expenditure must authorise any individual commitment to provide an official with accommodation for life and after retirement. General authority to rent accommodation for work, or a rule permitting housing for officials, does not authorise a materially different lifelong obligation to pay rent. Later contracts cannot create that obligation without the required approval. Ratification requires clear adoption, or conduct amounting to clear recognition, with knowledge of the material circumstances. Continued administrative payments do not suffice where the decision-maker remains uninformed or undecided. A security arrangement made to meet continuing risks may extend beyond employment, but a tax-accountancy benefit justified by employment functions does not. An equitable-compensation claim based on fiduciary breach fails without proof of such breach.

The National Union sought declarations concerning benefits paid to Arthur Scargill during and after his employment as a national official, including the rent and outgoings of a Barbican flat, fuel costs, a security system at his Yorkshire home and accountancy charges. It also sought repayment, framed as equitable compensation, of certain post-retirement payments.

Mr Scargill counterclaimed for declarations and payment of the benefits. The principal dispute was whether the Union’s governing bodies had authorised, or later ratified, contractual rights said to continue after retirement. The court also considered estoppel, the extent of the fuel entitlement, the duration of the security obligation and the pleaded basis for equitable compensation.

1. Barbican flat. The 1982 decisions authorised payment of rent and associated outgoings for accommodation in inner London, but did not authorise a contractual right to payment for life and after retirement. A rented London base was materially different from the Union-owned accommodation and retirement rights enjoyed by predecessors. The later contracts were therefore ineffective because the NEC had not authorised the commitments. The Union was entitled to a declaration that it had no obligation from 1 August 2002 to pay the specified costs.
2. The NEC did not ratify the later contracts. Its 2008 and 2009 acceptance of reports did not amount to approval of their contents; the reference to further questions showed unfinished business. In any event, the NEC lacked full knowledge of the material circumstances. Continued payment after the 2009 meeting was not clear recognition or adoption. Estoppel also failed because no common assumption between Mr Scargill and the NEC was established.
3. Fuel. The admitted cash-in-lieu entitlement was capped at the value of the applicable concessionary coal allowance, found to be ten tonnes. The 1975 decision concerning heating costs placed national officials in the same position as Area officials and did not create an unlimited entitlement.
4. Security. The obligation to pay the security-system costs continued while Mr Scargill owned Treelands, because the risks arising from his Union activities could continue after retirement. With some hesitation, the court held that it also extended to a widow occupying the property.
5. Accountancy costs and equitable compensation. Any employment-related obligation to pay tax-accountancy costs did not continue after retirement. The Union’s equitable-compensation claim was dismissed because it had not proved that the signatories acted in breach of fiduciary duty. The court did not decide whether a differently pleaded restitutionary claim might have succeeded.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.