Gorczowska, R (on the application of) v District Court In Torun Poland

In an extradition case engaging Article 8, evidence available at first instance may exceptionally be admitted on appeal where it directly concerns human rights, although its untested nature may affect its weight. The court must assess proportionality with the purpose of extradition in mind. Family life established in the United Kingdom, including the interests of a young child, will rarely outweigh the public interest in enforcing a sentence imposed by another European Union member state. The threshold is higher than in an ordinary immigration case, but need not necessarily be the exceptionally high threshold stated in Norris v United States while that approach is under reconsideration. Delay adds nothing where it does not independently make extradition oppressive.

The claimant appealed against the decision that she should be extradited to Poland to serve a suspended 10-month sentence for possessing just over 4 grams of amphetamine. She had left Poland in breach of the conditions of suspension and later had a young child in the United Kingdom. On appeal she relied on evidence about her circumstances and those of the child, principally under Article 8. She also relied on delay and oppression. The central issues were whether the new evidence could be considered and whether extradition would be disproportionate.

1. Fresh evidence. The ordinary approach, described as a Ladd v Marshall approach, is that evidence available below will normally not be admitted on appeal. Evidence directly bearing on human rights should, however, more readily be considered by a public body required to take account of Convention rights. Its failure to be tested below may affect its weight.
2. Article 8 and extradition. The court had to decide whether extradition would be disproportionate. It was inappropriate to review the correctness or proportionality of the Polish sentence except in the most exceptional circumstances. The assessment had to respect the purpose of extradition and the principle that persons convicted and sentenced in another European Union member state should not evade punishment by establishing family life in the United Kingdom.
3. The applicable threshold was lower than the exceptionally high threshold stated in Norris v United States, pending possible reconsideration by the Supreme Court, but remained higher than in immigration cases. The child’s age, dependency, possible difficulties in Poland, the maximum period of imprisonment and possible alternative care were insufficient to make extradition disproportionate. The Polish state’s Convention obligations and the possibility of care for the child were relevant.
4. The delay argument added nothing to the Article 8 claim and did not approach oppression. The appeal was dismissed. A public funding certificate was granted.

The judgment records an appeal against a district judge’s decision ordering extradition to Poland. No citation for the district judge’s decision is stated.