Seroka, R (on the application of) v Redhill Magistrates Court

Where a magistrates’ court refuses to state a case, the Administrative Court should adopt the course involving the fewest additional steps, least expense, delay and duplication. It may determine the substance of the dispute directly where the material is sufficient.

Section 20 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 provides a facilitative evidential procedure for records from prescribed devices. It is not exclusive. Such records may also be admitted through conventional live evidence as real evidence. A conviction is unsafe where the magistrates relied on a secondary check or other evidence whose admissibility was materially disputed, and their reasons do not establish that the conviction would have followed from admissible primary evidence alone.

The claimant was convicted by Redhill Magistrates’ Court of speeding, contrary to sections 81 and 89 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The prosecution relied on a Gatso device record, live evidence from a camera technician, and expert evidence concerning a secondary check based on road markings.

The claimant applied for a case to be stated, arguing that evidence concerning the spacing of the road markings was inadmissible hearsay. The magistrates refused, certifying the application as frivolous. Permission for judicial review was granted. The central issues were whether the primary Gatso evidence was admissible independently of section 20 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, whether the secondary-check requirement was a condition of approval, and whether the conviction was safe.

1. Disposition. The claim for judicial review was granted and the conviction was quashed. It was unnecessary and disproportionate to require the magistrates to state a case. The consequential costs order was also to be quashed.
2. Approach to refusal to state a case. Applying the practical guidance in Sunworld Ltd v Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [2001] 1 WLR 2102, the court should choose the procedure involving the fewest additional steps and the least expense, delay and duplication. Where the existing material permits determination of the real dispute, the court may address the substance directly.
3. Admissibility of the Gatso record. Section 20 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 is permissive rather than exclusive. Consistently with DPP v Thornley [2006] EWHC 312 (Admin), the statutory certificate procedure enables records and certificates to be admitted without calling a witness, but does not prevent the record being proved conventionally by live evidence. The primary record was therefore admissible as real evidence without relying on the statutory certificate procedure.
4. The conditions attached to Secretary of State approval became relevant only if the prosecution relied on section 20. In any event, the agreement concerning secondary checks did not impose a condition within section 20(5). Alternatively, the requirement concerned the device’s capability in principle and was satisfied; it did not require a secondary check to be proved in every individual case.
5. The magistrates’ reasons expressly relied on the secondary check and on the expert evidence based on it. The court could not be satisfied that they would have convicted on the primary Gatso record alone. The conviction was therefore unsafe and had to be quashed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the claim for judicial review was granted, the conviction was quashed, and the consequential costs order was to be quashed.