Grazette v The Director of Pubic Prosecutions

Evidence extracted from a police criminal-intelligence record may satisfy the business-document exception to hearsay where the information’s content and context support the conclusion that its original supplier may reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the matters recorded. An unidentified source does not automatically make the evidence inadmissible.

The court may assess the reliability of the information under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 117(7), by considering its precision, internal links and corroboration. Where those features sufficiently support admissibility and reliability, no separate exclusion arose under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

The appellant appealed by way of case stated from the Croydon Magistrates’ Court. He had been convicted of assault after the magistrates admitted evidence consisting of an extract from a police criminal-intelligence record.

The extract linked the appellant with the street name “Nasty”, a particular address and identifying details. The original source of the information was not identified, and the evidence involved multiple hearsay. The central issue was whether the statutory requirements for admitting the information as a business document were satisfied, particularly the requirement concerning the supplier’s personal knowledge and the reliability of the evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The magistrates had not erred in law by admitting and relying on the extract from the criminal-intelligence record.
2. Section 117(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was satisfied because the statement concerned a matter that could have been given in oral evidence. The occupational requirements in section 117(2)(a) and (c) were also met.
3. The requirement in section 117(2)(b) was satisfied. Although the original supplier was unknown, the precise information linking the appellant with the nickname “Nasty”, a numbered address and identifying details supported the inference that the supplier may reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of those matters.
4. The magistrates were entitled to consider the content and context of the information, together with the complainant’s evidence and the evidence that the appellant had been arrested at the address. Those matters provided sufficient support for the statutory inference and for the conclusion under section 117(7) that the evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admitted and relied upon.
5. The additional objections under section 117(5) and section 116(2)(d) did not prevent admission. No separate issue arose under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

The questions in the case stated were answered in the negative.

• Croydon Magistrates’ Court: convicted the appellant and admitted the criminal-intelligence extract as a business document.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal by way of case stated and upheld the evidential ruling.