Zielinski v The Circuit Court of Zielona Gora Poland

In extradition proceedings, lapse of time will not ordinarily make extradition oppressive where the requested person left the requesting state knowing that proceedings remained outstanding and intending to avoid them. The delay must not be attributable to the person’s own choice and conduct. Reliance on delay may arise where the requesting state deliberately decided not to pursue the case, communicated that decision to the accused, or created a comparable sense of security. The court must assess the requesting person’s conduct and the circumstances in which the delay occurred.

The claimant appealed against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Poland. He faced warrants relating to allegations of forgery, burglary, criminal damage, threats to kill and theft. The alleged offences dated from 2002 and 2004, and the proceedings had been delayed. The claimant argued that returning him would now be oppressive because of the passage of time. He did not contend that the delay made a fair trial impossible or that extradition would be unjust. The central issue was whether the delay was sufficiently independent of his own conduct to justify refusing extradition.

1. Appeal dismissed. The claimant could not rely on the passage of time as a ground for refusing extradition.
2. The relevant question was whether the delay was of the claimant’s own choice and making. A person who leaves the requesting state knowing that proceedings remain outstanding, with the intention of avoiding them, cannot ordinarily establish oppression based solely on the age of the allegations.
3. The principle identified in Gomes v Government of Trinidad [2009] UKHL 21 was applied. A sense of security sufficient to make delay independent of the accused’s conduct would require a deliberate decision by the requesting state not to pursue the case, communicated to the accused, or a comparable circumstance.
4. The claimant had been aware that the relevant proceedings had not ended. Although there had been delays attributable to the Polish authorities, he failed to appear for hearings and left Poland. Those circumstances prevented him from asserting that he had obtained security from the authorities’ conduct.
5. The District Judge had been entitled to conclude that extradition was not oppressive. The usual order was made, subject to the representation-order and assessment arrangements referred to in court.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order was dismissed.