A v SM & Anor

Under Part 4A of the Family Law Act 1996, the court may make protective orders where a person has been forced, or is at risk of being forced, into marriage without free and full consent. The court must consider all the circumstances, with particular regard to health, safety and wellbeing and, where appropriate, the person’s wishes and feelings. Force includes coercion by threats or psychological means. The applicant bears the burden of proving the relevant facts on the balance of probabilities. A finding that a witness has lied on one matter does not establish that the witness has lied generally; the court must consider the possible reasons for the lie.

A, aged 20, applied for forced marriage protection orders concerning herself and her six younger siblings. Her parents denied intending to force her or her siblings into marriage and said that her sister B had voluntarily married in Bangladesh. Earlier interim orders had been made after A returned to England and raised concerns about the proposed marriage. B later alleged that she had been pressured into the marriage and that the parents had misled the court about it. The central issues were whether the parents had attempted or intended to force A into marriage, whether B had been forced into marriage without free and full consent, and whether the younger children were at risk.

1. The application succeeded. The court found that B had been forced into marriage, that the parents had intended to force A into marriage, and that the younger children faced a very strong likelihood of being forced into marriage unless protected.
2. Under s.63A of the Family Law Act 1996, the court’s task was to decide whether protective orders were required, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the protected person’s health, safety and wellbeing and, where appropriate, wishes and feelings. Force included coercion by threats or psychological means.
3. The applicant bore the burden of proof, which was the balance of probabilities. The court accepted A’s and B’s evidence and rejected the parents’ evidence. The parents’ lies about B’s marriage were relevant, but the court assessed them in context.
4. Applying R v Lucas [1981] QB 720, a lie may arise from shame, panic, duress or distress. A witness who lies about one matter does not thereby lie about everything. The court therefore considered the particular evidence separately and did not treat the inconsistencies in A’s account as determinative.
5. The existing forced marriage protection orders were renewed without limit of time. The five younger children remained wards of court, passports and travel documents were retained, and the children were joined as parties. The local authority was directed to prepare a report under s.37 of the Children Act 1989, and the matter was listed urgently to consider interim care orders.

This was a first-instance decision. The judgment records earlier interim orders made by Bodey J, Coleridge J and Moor J, but no appeal.