Associated Newspapers Ltd, R (on the application of) v Rt Hon Lord Justice Leveson

A public inquiry chairman may admit anonymous evidence where relevant witnesses would otherwise remain silent because of a real fear of career detriment. The decision must be made fairly and in the context of the inquiry’s terms of reference. Fairness requires the chairman to balance the value of obtaining the evidence against the prejudice to affected participants, including the reduced opportunity to test anonymous allegations. A general decision in principle is lawful if individual applications remain subject to careful scrutiny. The court should respect the chairman’s evaluative judgments and intervene only where the decision is incapable of rational justification or is plainly unfair.

Associated Newspapers Ltd sought judicial review of rulings by Lord Justice Leveson, chairman of the Leveson Inquiry, permitting journalists to give evidence anonymously where they feared career blight if identified. The Inquiry concerned the culture, practices and ethics of the press and possible recommendations for future regulation. The claimant alleged unfairness, insufficient openness, interference with article 10 rights and failure to justify restrictions under the Inquiries Act 2005.

The challenge concerned the lawfulness of the chairman’s general decision in principle, before individual anonymity applications had been determined. The central issue was whether admitting such evidence could be fair and lawful despite the prejudice to newspaper organisations and the limits on testing anonymous evidence.

1. Application dismissed. The rulings and protocol were a general decision in principle. They did not predetermine the outcome of individual applications, which remained subject to careful scrutiny of the witness’s circumstances, relevance and likely contribution to the Inquiry.

2. The duty under section 17(3) of the Inquiries Act 2005 required fairness to all persons with an interest in the outcome. That duty had to be understood in the context of the task entrusted to the chairman and the Inquiry’s terms of reference. Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention did not add materially different requirements in this case; the same balancing exercise was required.

3. The court identified three questions: whether there was a credible basis for believing that relevant witnesses would not come forward without anonymity; whether admitting the evidence would assist the Inquiry in the public interest; and whether the prejudice to newspaper organisations would make admission unfair notwithstanding that benefit. The first question was factual and the second evaluative. The chairman’s decision on those matters could be challenged only if incapable of rational justification. The ultimate question of fairness was for the court, while recognising the chairman’s superior knowledge of the Inquiry’s detail and context.

4. The chairman was entitled to conclude that relevant journalists feared career blight and that their evidence could fill an important gap in the Inquiry’s examination of newsroom culture and practices. Anonymous evidence would carry substantially less weight and could not properly be used to make specific findings against an identified newspaper or editor. Nevertheless, it could contribute to the wider assessment, particularly alongside identified evidence and contrary testimony.

5. There was no rule that fear for livelihood could never justify anonymity. The circumstances differed materially from inquiries where witnesses were known, compellable and seeking anonymity for personal safety. The chairman had not unlawfully prejudged individual applications. The court would not micromanage the Inquiry by prescribing a separate rule for hypothetical exculpatory material.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment does not state any earlier appellate decision.