Nursing and Midwifery Council v Drew

The court may extend an interim suspension order where the circumstances justify continued protection pending further disciplinary consideration. The appropriate duration depends on the procedural timetable, the risk to patients, prejudice to the registrant, and the practical circumstances of the case. A substantial delay does not automatically make an extension excessive. Where the application is unopposed, and a prompt investigative hearing is scheduled, an extension may properly last until that hearing and any resulting substantive proceedings can take place.

The Nursing and Midwifery Council applied under article 31(8) of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 to extend an interim suspension order imposed on Rebecca Jane Drew. The order was due to expire on 6 March 2012. The allegation concerned an inappropriate relationship with a vulnerable patient. The respondent did not appear and did not oppose the application.

The court considered the delay in progressing the disciplinary proceedings, the limited prejudice to the respondent, the existing conditions governing her practice, and the timetable for an Investigating Committee hearing.

1. The application was granted. The interim suspension order was extended for ten months, until 5 January 2013.

2. In determining the appropriate period of an extension under article 31(8) of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001, the court must consider the circumstances of the case, including delay, the prejudice to the registrant, the risk of harm to patients, and the timetable for determining whether there is a case to answer and how the disciplinary proceedings should progress.

3. The delay was partly systemic and partly attributable to the number of cases requiring consideration. Although ten months was a lengthy period, the respondent did not oppose the application, the allegation was not disputed, and the prejudice was reduced because the Investigating Committee had previously considered that any risk could be managed by conditions on practice rather than suspension.

4. It was appropriate to maintain the order for as long as necessary for the Investigating Committee hearing on 23 March 2012, an informed decision about future progress, and any substantive hearing. In the circumstances, the period sought was not excessive.

5. No order was made as to the costs of the application.

Not stated in the judgment.