Golden Eye (International) Ltd & Anor v Telefonica UK Ltd

[2012] EWHC 723 (Ch)

Case details

Case citations
[2012] EWHC 723 (Ch) · [2012] RPC 28
Court
High Court (Chancery Division)
Judgment date
26 March 2012
Judgment text

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Subjects
Intellectual property Human rights Norwich Pharmacal relief
Keywords
Norwich Pharmacal order copyright infringement peer-to-peer filesharing privacy data protection proportionality speculative invoicing champerty exclusive licence subscriber identification
Outcome
application granted in part (norwich pharmacal order for golden eye and ben dover productions; refused for the other claimants)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

On a Norwich Pharmacal application seeking subscribers’ identities, the court must balance the applicant’s intellectual property rights against the affected individuals’ privacy and data-protection rights. Neither side has automatic precedence. The court must focus intensely on the specific rights engaged, the justification for interference, and the ultimate proportionality of the proposed order.

An applicant need not undertake to issue proceedings. A genuine intention to seek redress may include sending pre-action correspondence and negotiating compensation. Evidence identifying an IP address does not establish that the subscriber was the infringer. Any order and letter must make that limitation clear and must avoid unsupported or intimidatory demands. An order may be proportionate for a copyright owner and exclusive licensee, but not where it would effectively endorse a revenue-sharing arrangement giving a third party control of litigation and most of the proceeds.

Factual background

The claimants sought a Norwich Pharmacal order requiring O2 to disclose the names and addresses of up to 9,124 subscribers associated with IP addresses allegedly used for peer-to-peer filesharing of pornographic films.

Golden Eye and Ben Dover Productions owned or exclusively licensed some of the relevant copyrights. The Other Claimants owned other copyrights and had granted Golden Eye contractual rights to act in relation to alleged infringements in return for substantial shares of recovered revenue. Consumer Focus intervened to present arguments on behalf of the unidentified subscribers.

The central issues were whether arguable wrongs had been committed, whether O2 was mixed up in them, whether the claimants genuinely intended to seek redress, whether disclosure was necessary, and whether the proposed order and associated correspondence were proportionate.

Held

  1. Disposition. A Norwich Pharmacal order was granted in favour of Golden Eye and Ben Dover Productions, subject to amendments safeguarding the intended defendants. No order was made in favour of the Other Claimants.
  2. Arguable wrongs and evidence. The evidence established a good arguable case that peer-to-peer filesharing had occurred through the identified IP addresses and that many, but not all, associated subscribers were the persons involved. Identification of a subscriber did not establish that the subscriber was the infringer. O2 was mixed up in the arguable wrongs.
  3. Standing and champerty. The Ben Dover Agreement was an exclusive licence within section 92(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, giving Golden Eye title to sue. The agreements with the Other Claimants did not give Golden Eye title to sue, although the Other Claimants themselves could bring claims. Those agreements were not shown to be champertous. Golden Eye was not conducting litigation in the strict sense applicable to legal representatives, and the arrangements did not, on the evidence, jeopardise the proper administration of justice.
  4. Genuine intention and necessity. A claimant need not intend or undertake to issue proceedings. Pre-action correspondence seeking compensation and future undertakings may constitute an attempt to obtain redress. A claimant may select which low-value claims to litigate, having regard to proportionality and cost. Disclosure was necessary because the claimants could not identify or contact the alleged wrongdoers without it.
  5. Proportionality. The court applied the approach in Re S requiring an intense focus on the comparative importance of the rights, the justifications for interference, and an ultimate balancing exercise. Copyright was protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol and Article 17(2) of the Charter. Privacy and personal-data rights under Article 8 of the Convention and Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter were engaged. The rights of copyright owners were rights of others for the purposes of the relevant limitation provisions.
  6. Safeguards and correspondence. The proposed order and letter had to explain that disclosure did not involve a finding of infringement, acknowledge that the subscriber might not be responsible, allow a reasonable response period, and remove unjustified references to other intellectual property and possible disconnection. A demand for £700 from every recipient was unsupported and appeared calculated to maximise revenue. The claimants should instead seek relevant information and negotiate any settlement individually, without specifying a figure in the initial letter. Any resulting claims were to be brought in the Patents County Court.
  7. Other Claimants. An order in favour of the Other Claimants would endorse an arrangement under which Golden Eye controlled the litigation and received about 75% of the revenue. That would amount to sanctioning the sale of subscribers’ privacy and data-protection rights. The Other Claimants had to seek redress themselves.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier Norwich Pharmacal orders obtained by Golden Eye against other internet service providers, but no appellate history of the present claim.

Appeal to higher court

Outcome of appeal
appeal allowed

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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