Wainhomes (South West) Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Anor

In planning appeals, an earlier decision is material only where the cases are alike in a relevant respect. If they are materially distinguishable, consistency does not require the decision-maker to explain a different outcome by reference to the earlier case.

Where a previous decision is material, the decision-maker must have regard to it and give reasons for departing from it. Reasons need not address every argument, but must enable the reader to understand the conclusions on the principal controversial issues.

A decision-maker may accept an inspector’s reasoning on prematurity while rejecting the inspector’s separate assessment of housing need, provided the remaining reasoning independently supports the conclusion and the decision is read fairly and as a whole.

Wainhomes challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 the Secretary of State’s refusal of outline permission for a large mixed-use development at Treverbyn Road, St Austell.

The Council had failed to determine the application, and the claimant appealed under section 78. The Secretary of State recovered the appeal under section 79 and paragraph 3 of Schedule 3. An inspector recommended dismissal, principally on prematurity grounds. After receiving updated evidence, the Secretary of State accepted that an adequate five-year housing-land supply probably did not exist, but nevertheless dismissed the appeal because permitting the very large scheme could prejudice the emerging Cornwall Core Strategy and wider local policy objectives.

The claimant alleged inconsistency with the Secretary of State’s later decision in the Binhamy Farm appeal, internal inconsistency, irrationality and inadequate reasons.

1. Application refused. The Secretary of State’s decision was not unlawful.
2. The principle that like planning cases should be decided alike, stated in North Wiltshire DC v Secretary of State for the Environment (1992) 65 P & C.R. 137, requires attention to an earlier decision only where it is alike and not distinguishable in a relevant respect. The Binhamy No. 2 decision concerned a materially smaller proposal, a different town and different effects on the relevant planning choices. It was therefore not material by reference to consistency.
3. The inspector’s reference to the earlier Binhamy decision, adopted by the Secretary of State, concerned the localism principle rather than the particular planning judgment in that case. The decision letter was not to be read with an excessively legalistic eye.
4. The duty to give reasons, explained in South Bucks DC v Porter (No. 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953, required reasons sufficient to show why the application was refused and how the principal controversial issues were resolved. The decision letter made clear that the proposal’s scale, conflict with the development plan and potential prejudice to the emerging LDF process justified refusal.
5. There was no irrational internal inconsistency. The Secretary of State could reject the inspector’s finding on housing need while adopting the prematurity reasoning based on the proposal’s scale, phasing, first-phase location and effect on the range of sites available for local assessment. The application was accordingly refused.

This was a first-instance judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The judgment does not state any subsequent appellate decision.