Selina Akosua Buama v Entry Clearance Officer - Accra

A valid adoption order made by a competent foreign court satisfies paragraph 310(vi) of the Immigration Rules (HC 395) unless its validity is properly impugned. An entry clearance officer cannot reject an order valid on its face merely by setting out a provision of foreign legislation. A challenge to the order’s validity requires expert evidence.

Whether an overseas adoption is one of convenience depends on its substance. A genuine long-term arrangement made because the child’s parents or carers cannot provide adequate care, and involving a genuine transfer of parental responsibility, is not rendered one of convenience merely because it also enables admission to the United Kingdom.

The appellant, a Ghanaian child, sought entry clearance to join her settled Ghanaian adoptive parents in the United Kingdom. The Entry Clearance Officer refused the application under paragraph 310 of the Immigration Rules (HC 395). The refusal challenged the validity of a Ghanaian adoption order and found neither a genuine transfer of parental responsibility nor an adoption other than one of convenience.

Immigration Judge Walker dismissed the appeal. Permission to appeal was granted because the judge’s treatment of the adoption documentation was arguably flawed. The parties agreed before the Upper Tribunal that the Immigration Judge’s decision contained an error of law and that the appeal should be reheard. The central issues were the validity of the adoption order and compliance with paragraph 310, with paragraph 297(1)(f) and Article 8 advanced in the alternative.

1. The appeal was allowed. The Immigration Judge’s decision was flawed in law and was remade. The appellant satisfied paragraph 310 of the Immigration Rules (HC 395), and the Tribunal directed the grant of appropriate entry clearance.

2. The Ghanaian adoption order was valid on its face. Paragraph 310(vi) did not contemplate the Entry Clearance Officer questioning an order of a competent court in those circumstances. The mere reproduction of a provision of the Ghanaian 1998 Children’s Act was insufficient to establish invalidity; a challenge required expert evidence. The Ghanaian court’s later letter confirmed that the later order corrected the earlier order while preserving the adoption date of 18 November 2010.

3. The evidence established paragraph 310(ix). The appellant’s mother had died, her father had played no significant part in her life and was unable to care for her, and the sponsors had funded and arranged her care for many years. Alternative arrangements had proved unsatisfactory. These facts showed that the adoption resulted from the inability of the original parents or carers to care for her and that parental responsibility had genuinely transferred to the sponsors.

4. The adoption was not one of convenience under paragraph 310(xi). It followed a long-standing, genuine effort by the sponsors to secure suitable care for the appellant, rather than a transaction with no substantive parental relationship. The Tribunal reached that conclusion independently of VB v Entry Clearance Officer Ghana.

5. Although unnecessary to the result, the Tribunal held that the appellant would also have met paragraph 297(1)(f): the circumstances were serious and compelling, and exclusion was undesirable. It was likewise plainly in her best interests to live with the sponsors, whom she regarded as her natural parents.

• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): The Tribunal found that the Immigration Judge’s decision was flawed in law, remade it, and allowed the appeal under paragraph 310 of the Immigration Rules (HC 395).
• First-tier Tribunal: Immigration Judge Walker dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 12 July 2011. No citation is stated in the judgment.
• Entry Clearance Officer: Entry clearance was refused on 14 January 2011.