C (Children), Re

Section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 prevents an appeal from a court’s decision to grant or refuse permission to appeal. The bar includes a proposed appeal to the Court of Appeal from a county court judge’s refusal of permission while exercising appellate jurisdiction. A party cannot circumvent that prohibition by characterising the challenge as a second appeal. The Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction to entertain the application and must dismiss it.

A district judge made care and placement orders concerning the mother’s two children. The mother filed a notice of appeal out of time. Judge Deeley adjourned the application for permission to appeal and remitted the matter to the district judge for amplified reasons.

On 3 May 2013, Her Honour Judge Hindley QC refused both an extension of time and permission to appeal. The mother then applied to the Court of Appeal for permission to appeal against that refusal. The application was considered on the papers. The central issue was whether an appeal lay from an appellate court’s refusal of permission to appeal.

1. Application dismissed. Judge Hindley’s order was a decision by an appellate court refusing permission to appeal. Section 54(4) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 expressly prohibited an appeal from that decision. The same position was reflected in FPR PD30A, paragraph 4.5.
2. The mother’s application was not a second appeal. It was an attempt to appeal against a refusal of permission by the appellate court below. The statutory prohibition therefore applied, and the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to entertain the mother’s complaints. Moyse v Regal Mortgages Limited Partnership [2004] EWCA Civ 1269 and Crossland v University of Glamorgan [2012] EWCA Civ 1709 supported that conclusion.
3. The earlier remittal to the district judge for amplification of reasons had been made under FPR PD30A, paragraphs 4.6–4.9, and established practice. It did not alter the jurisdictional bar.
4. Separately, the court strongly criticised the unjustified delay in obtaining the transcript of Judge Hindley’s judgment. The delay had unnecessarily delayed the appeal process. This observation did not affect the disposition, but the President proposed bringing the matter to the attention of Designated Family Judges and HMCTS.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The present application for permission to appeal against Judge Hindley’s refusal of permission was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 30 April 2013, McFarlane LJ dismissed the mother’s separate application for permission to appeal against Judge Deeley’s directions order and certified it under CPR 52.3(4A)(a).
• Birmingham County Court (Her Honour Judge Hindley QC): On 3 May 2013, the judge refused an extension of time and permission to appeal from the care and placement orders.
• Birmingham County Court (Her Honour Judge Deeley): On 8 February 2013, the judge adjourned the permission application and remitted the matter for amplification of the district judge’s reasons under FPR PD30A.
• Birmingham County Court (District Judge Asokan): On 26 September 2012, the judge made care and placement orders concerning the two children.