FS (Ghana) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Permission to appeal in an immigration case requires an arguable error of law of some significance. It is not a route for rearguing evidence-based findings of fact merely because they are adverse. Where the tribunal has directed itself appropriately in law, considered the relevant circumstances, including the interests of children, and performed the necessary balancing exercise, disagreement with its conclusion does not establish an appealable error. An adjournment may properly be refused where the applicant has already received a final opportunity to provide new material, the time allowed has expired, and no material addition to the appeal has been identified.

The applicant, his wife and their two children, all Ghanaian citizens, challenged the refusal of indefinite leave to remain on the basis that the applicant had failed to disclose criminal convictions. An Immigration Judge rejected the applicant’s evidence on the material issues. Permission was subsequently granted and First-tier Tribunal Judge Davidge conducted a redetermination, again rejecting the evidence and considering the interests of the children.

The applicant renewed applications for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. He challenged the findings concerning non-disclosure, relied on the children’s residence and circumstances in the United Kingdom, and raised concerns about return to Ghana, including pressure relating to female genital mutilation. The central issue was whether the proposed grounds disclosed an arguable error of law.

1. Permission to appeal. Lady Justice Hallett held that the applicant faced a high threshold. He had to establish an error of law of some significance. The proposed appeal was, in substance, an attempt to challenge adverse findings of fact for which the tribunal had given reasons. That did not disclose an arguable ground of appeal.
2. Consideration of the children and other circumstances. The tribunal had conducted a thorough redetermination, directed itself appropriately in law, and considered the relevant factors. These included the children’s interests, their time in the United Kingdom, their health and education, the family’s circumstances, and the consequences of return to Ghana. The tribunal had carried out the balancing exercise and was entitled to reach a conclusion in favour of the Secretary of State.
3. Adjournment. The renewed application to adjourn was refused. A similar application had already been granted by Leveson LJ, with a final opportunity to place new material before the court. The time allowed had expired, no new material was available, and it was unclear how any further material would assist the permission application.
4. Disposition. The applicant could not resurrect the persecution argument, having accepted that it could not properly be pursued. His remaining submissions did not identify any proper or arguable ground of appeal. The renewed applications for permission to appeal were refused.

1. Immigration Judge: The applicant’s evidence was rejected on the material issues, including the alleged risks on return to Ghana and his background.
2. First-tier Tribunal: Following permission to appeal, First-tier Tribunal Judge Davidge conducted a redetermination, rejected the evidence again, and considered the interests of the children.
3. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The applicant’s renewed applications for permission to appeal the redetermination were refused. The cover records the matter as arising from the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber).