G (A Child), Re

Permission for a second appeal may be justified by a compelling reason where a care plan would place a child in long-term foster care for most of childhood and the lower court’s judgment may lack an adequate welfare analysis of that plan. A finding that immediate rehabilitation is not possible does not, without further analysis, determine that long-term foster care without future rehabilitation is the appropriate plan. An appellate court should be able to examine whether the care plan was properly assessed by reference to the child’s welfare.

A mother applied for permission to bring a second appeal against the dismissal of her first appeal from a care order made in respect of her son.

The original court found that the child had suffered the relevant risk of harm through the mother’s inability on occasions to prioritise his needs. It approved a care plan for long-term foster care, with no rehabilitation to the mother, while preserving regular contact.

The first appellate judge dismissed the challenge to the factual findings and treated the original judge’s welfare analysis as implicit. The central issue was whether the apparent absence of a sufficient analysis supporting a lengthy foster-care plan supplied a compelling reason for a second appeal.

1. Permission to appeal was granted. The proposed challenge to the factual findings had no prospect of success. The findings supporting the care threshold were properly made, and the child could not return to the mother immediately.

2. Those conclusions did not, however, automatically justify a plan under which the child would spend the greater part of his remaining childhood in long-term foster care with no prospect of rehabilitation. Such a plan was a substantial and restrictive welfare decision, notwithstanding that it was not an adoption placement.

3. The original judgment did not appear to contain sufficient judicial analysis of the welfare basis for endorsing that plan or of the prospects of rehabilitation in the future. The first appellate judge recognised that the original judgment did not expressly weigh the welfare considerations, but treated the necessary exercise as implicit. That inference might not be sufficient.

4. Given the duration and effect of the long-term foster-care plan, the possible inadequacy of the lower courts’ analysis was a sufficiently compelling reason for a second appeal. The Court of Appeal should therefore consider the care-plan issue in detail.

The court directed that the transcript be expedited and encouraged the mother to obtain specialist legal representation for the appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Granted the mother permission to bring a second appeal on the adequacy of the welfare analysis supporting the long-term foster-care plan.

• Principal Registry of the Family Division On 23 July 2012, HHJ Hughes dismissed the mother’s appeal from the care order.

• Inner London and City Family Proceedings Court On 30 April 2012, District Judge Tempia made a care order for the child.