Reeves v Northrop

Rateable occupation requires actual, exclusive and beneficial occupation which has a sufficient character of permanence. Permanence is a question of fact and degree, assessed from all the circumstances. Duration is an important factor and may be determinative, although it is not invariably the sole consideration.

An occupation lasting two years may overwhelmingly establish permanence where a vessel has served continuously as the occupier’s home at essentially the same mooring. A tribunal errs in law if it fails to recognise the decisive weight of duration or gives no adequate explanation for treating that evidence as outweighed.

A family lived aboard a motor vessel which remained at essentially the same estuary mooring for about two years. The Listing Officer entered the vessel in the council tax valuation list. The Valuation Tribunal ordered its deletion, finding that no rateable hereditament had been established because the occupation lacked sufficient permanence.

On the Listing Officer’s appeal, Wyn Williams J held that the Tribunal had failed to give proper significance to the duration of occupation. He decided that remittal was unnecessary and restored the vessel’s entry in the valuation list.

The occupier appealed. The central issue was whether the Tribunal had erred in law when distinguishing a settled occupation from a transient occupation for rating purposes.

1. Appeal dismissed. The four conditions of rateable occupation are actual occupation, exclusivity for the occupier’s purposes, benefit or value to the occupier, and occupation possessing a sufficient quality of permanence. The parties accepted that the first three conditions were satisfied. The dispute concerned permanence.

2. The character of permanence must be assessed from all the facts and circumstances. Duration is an important consideration but is not invariably the sole consideration. Relevant matters may include intention and the nature and location of the mooring. Intention is not overriding. The physical mooring arrangements may also bear on permanence, although they carried little material weight here.

3. The distinction is between a settler and a wayfarer. A settler adopts the property as a residence for settled purposes within the regular order of life for the time being. A wayfarer remains itinerant and has no fixed abode. Permanence does not require occupation without a foreseeable end.

4. The Valuation Tribunal had nevertheless erred in law. The vessel had remained essentially in the same position and had served as the family home for about two years. In those circumstances, duration was the single most important and determinative factor. The Tribunal treated it merely as one part of the evidence and gave no adequate explanation for finding that it was outweighed by other considerations.

5. The Tribunal was entitled to be aware of deletions of other live-aboard craft from valuation lists, but that evidence carried little weight. Any error concerning it was immaterial.

6. The relevant facts were undisputed. No reasonable tribunal properly directing itself could have concluded that the occupation was too transient. The vessel had therefore been correctly entered in the council tax valuation list. Patten and Hughes LJJ agreed with Sir Alan Ward.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The occupier’s appeal was dismissed. The High Court’s order restoring the vessel to the council tax valuation list was upheld.

2. High Court, Administrative Court: Wyn Williams J allowed the Listing Officer’s appeal. He held that the Valuation Tribunal had failed to treat duration as an important factor and decided that remittal was unnecessary.

3. Valuation Tribunal for England: The occupier’s appeal was allowed and the entry relating to the vessel was ordered to be deleted from the council tax valuation list with effect from 11 December 2008.