Hunt, R (on the application of) v North Somerset Council

At the permission stage, the court considers whether a proposed ground is sufficiently arguable and whether, taking its arguability together with the importance of the issue, permission should be granted. The court does not determine the appeal’s merits. Permission may be confined to a narrow, discrete issue arising from the lower court’s reasoning, while a wider challenge is refused. A point that is weak as a freestanding challenge may nevertheless be advanced as part of a broader arguable ground.

The appellant sought permission to appeal from the Administrative Court’s judgment concerning North Somerset Council’s decision to reduce its youth services budget. The proposed appeal challenged compliance with the consultation duty under Education Act 1996, section 507, and the council’s consideration of its public sector equality duty under the Equality Act, section 149.

The Administrative Court had considered that the consultation cumulatively satisfied section 507 and had made findings about the material considered by councillors. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether the proposed grounds, together with the importance of the issues, justified permission and, for Ground 2, whether permission should be confined to a specific evidential point.

Permission granted in part. Lord Justice Toulson directed that the appeal be heard by three judges, possibly including one High Court judge.

1. Ground 1. The challenge under section 507 of the Education Act 1996 concerned whether the council had taken adequate steps to ascertain the views of qualifying persons before reducing the youth services budget. The lower court had held that the general public consultation and meetings with youth-service management committees cumulatively satisfied the statutory duty. Toulson LJ considered that there was sufficient substance in the argument, coupled with the importance of the issue, to justify permission. He left the statutory question for determination on the appeal.
2. Ground 2. The proposed challenge under section 149 of the Equality Act was initially viewed as substantially factual. Permission was nevertheless granted on the narrow question whether the judge had erred in inferring that councillors had familiarised themselves with equality impact assessments merely because those documents had been made available for downloading. The point was borderline, but it was arguable in the context of the wider appeal.
3. Permission was refused for a more extensive challenge to the adequacy of the equality impact assessments. The court noted that, even without the disputed inference, the full court might conclude that the relevant financial-plan appendix and other material supported the lower court’s conclusion. The argument that consultation had to reach the young people directly, rather than management committees, was not persuasive as a freestanding point but could be advanced as part of the general Ground 1 argument.

The order was allowed in part.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 15 January 2013, Toulson LJ granted permission on Ground 1 and on a narrow point under Ground 2, refused permission for a wider challenge to the equality impact assessments, and directed a three-judge appeal.
• Administrative Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Mr Justice Williams had held that the consultation arrangements cumulatively satisfied section 507 of the Education Act 1996 and made findings concerning the material considered by councillors. The citation of that judgment was not stated.