Howard v Howard -Lawson

An appellate court will interfere with a trial judge’s case-management decision only where it was plainly wrong and caused significant injustice. It will not reopen findings of fact merely because another conclusion was possible; intervention requires an absence of supporting evidence or a material misunderstanding of the evidence. A challenge to a transaction for undue influence must also confront delay and subsequent dealings with the property, and may be barred by laches. Claims vested in a trustee in bankruptcy cannot ordinarily be pursued by the bankrupt after the relevant interest has been sold. An alleged fiduciary duty must have a legal basis; a parent who is also a beneficiary of a trust is not thereby obliged to use trust assets to meet another beneficiary’s personal liabilities.

The claimant appealed in person from the judgment of Norris J in the Chancery Division, which dismissed his claims against his father, Sir John Howard-Lawson, except for the claim concerning the Coniscliffe ground rents. The claims arose from the administration and partition of a family estate, the execution of a disentailing deed and powers deed, the subsequent sale of estate assets, and the purchase of the claimant’s reversionary interest after his bankruptcy.

The claimant alleged procedural unfairness, undue influence, breach of trust and fiduciary duty, inadequate disclosure, false accounting and other failures in the administration of the estate. The renewed application concerned whether any of those grounds had a real prospect of overcoming the trial judge’s factual and legal conclusions.

1. Application dismissed. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. The judge’s order dismissing the claimant’s actions was not shown to be vulnerable on any of the proposed grounds.
2. The Court of Appeal would interfere with a case-management decision only if it was plainly wrong and caused significant injustice. Although there had been failures in disclosure and compliance with orders, the trial judge had provided the documents needed, allowed a short adjournment and allowed a further four-week period for preparation. The refusal of a further adjournment did not prevent a fair trial.
3. The appellate court would not substitute its view for findings of fact that were open to the trial judge. Intervention required that there was no evidence to support the findings or that they resulted from a misunderstanding of relevant evidence. Much of the claimant’s argument merely preferred one possible factual conclusion over another.
4. There was no realistic prospect of establishing undue influence in relation to the disentailing deed or powers deed. The claimant had received independent legal advice, the safeguards in the powers deed required his consent to advances of capital, and the deed had not been used to terminate the settlement. Any challenge to the partition was in any event barred by laches after 28 years of dealing with the property.
5. The claimant’s reversionary interest, including any claims for breach of trust, had vested in his trustee in bankruptcy and had later been purchased by his father. The sale sanctioned by the Canterbury County Court had not been challenged by appeal and could not be reopened through the present action. The alleged fiduciary duties concerning the sale and the failed IVA had no legal basis.
6. The remaining grounds, including those concerning tax, estate assets, insurance policies, chattels, loans, manorial rights, the fixtures payment, consent to the estate sale and fees, either depended on findings of fact open to the judge, raised no legally viable claim, were statute barred, or disclosed no loss.

The application was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed application for permission to appeal dismissed; the order of Norris J was left undisturbed.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: Norris J’s order dated 12 November 2012 dismissed the claimant’s actions against Sir John Howard-Lawson except for the claim concerning the Coniscliffe ground rents.