Warring -Davies v Santander Bank Plc

Permission for a second appeal requires an issue of principle or another compelling reason. A challenge to a lower court’s assessment that a bank may retain transaction data for six years is ordinarily a challenge to fact, not an issue of principle. Under section 10 of the Data Protection Act, data must be deleted after a period reasonable in the circumstances. Retention may be reasonable where relevant to limitation risks and financial institutions’ money-laundering obligations.

The applicant challenged Santander’s refusal to erase personal data arising from an unsuccessful 2010 mortgage application. District Judge Edwards rejected the claim in 2011. His Honour Judge Spencer QC dismissed the ensuing appeal on 8 May 2012, holding that retention of transaction records for six years after dealings ended was reasonable. The applicant sought permission to bring a second appeal. The central questions were whether the proposed appeal raised an issue of principle or another compelling reason, and whether the retention period was reasonable under section 10 of the Data Protection Act.

1. The renewed application for permission to bring a second appeal was refused. The proposed appeal did not satisfy the requirement that a second appeal raise an issue of principle or involve some other compelling reason.
2. Section 10 of the Data Protection Act entitled an individual to require a data controller, at the end of a period reasonable in the circumstances, to cease processing specified personal data. The statutory question therefore concerned the reasonableness of the retention period in context.
3. Both lower courts were entitled, on the evidence, to conclude that Santander could retain a record of its transactions with the applicant until six years after it had finished dealing with him. Relevant considerations included the possibility of proceedings arising from the mortgage refusal, the six-year limitation period and financial institutions’ continuing obligations to provide information for routine money-laundering enquiries.
4. The conclusion that six-year retention was reasonable was a finding of fact with which the Court of Appeal would be most unlikely to interfere. There was no realistic prospect of the court reaching a different conclusion, even if the application had concerned a first appeal. The court agreed with Sir Richard Buxton that the lower courts were plainly entitled to reach their conclusion.

Order: application refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed application for permission to bring a second appeal refused on 12 June 2013.
2. Bradford County Court: District Judge Edwards rejected the claim in 2011; His Honour Judge Spencer QC dismissed the appeal on 8 May 2012.