McKenzie, R v

In sentencing a participant in a serious “crash for cash” fraud, the court may take account of the prevalence of that offending and the need for deterrence. A sentencing guideline category need not be applied mechanically where the facts do not fit neatly within one category. A starting point above the guideline figure may be justified, subject to proper allowance for personal mitigation and delay.

A contribution towards prosecution costs should be ordered only where the defendant has the ability and means to pay without undue financial strain. The court must have sufficient and current information about those means.

The appellant was convicted at Newcastle-upon-Tyne Crown Court of a single fraud arising from a fabricated road traffic collision. False claims of almost £33,000 were made and paid by insurers. He was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay £3,242 towards prosecution costs.

He appealed against both the sentence and the costs order. The issues were whether the custodial sentence was excessive and whether the costs order properly reflected his means.

1. The appeal against sentence was dismissed. The fraud was part of a wider and serious pattern of fabricated insurance claims. Although the appellant’s fraud concerned a single purported collision, it was pursued over a significant period through repeated medical examinations in support of a false whiplash claim. The sentencing guideline did not have to be fitted mechanically into one category.

2. The sentencing judge was entitled to treat the prevalence of this form of fraud and the need for deterrence as aggravating features. That approach was consistent with R v M [2013] EWCA 206 (Crim) and with the statutory sentencing purpose of reducing crime by deterrence under section 142(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. A starting point above 15 months, followed by reductions for personal mitigation and delay, was justified. The final sentence of 15 months was not excessive.

3. The appeal against the costs order was allowed. The court rejected the submission that no costs order should have been made. The investigation into the appellant’s own fraud would itself have been costly. However, a defendant should be required to contribute only if he has the ability and means to pay. The sentencing judge had not been given sufficient information about the appellant’s financial position and employment prospects.

4. On the available information, the appellant could contribute without placing undue financial strain on his family, but not in the sum ordered. The costs order was varied from £3,242 to £1,500, payable within the period fixed below.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against the 15-month sentence was dismissed. The appeal against the prosecution costs order was allowed, and the order was varied to £1,500.

• Newcastle-upon-Tyne Crown Court: The appellant was convicted of fraud after trial. Judge Thorn QC sentenced him to 15 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay £3,242 towards prosecution costs.