Leacock & Ors, R v

Under the former Criminal Justice Act 2003 regime, a direction crediting remand time was made only under section 240(3). Section 240(4) restricted that direction; it did not create a separate form of order. Days spent on remand while serving another imprisonment sentence could not be credited. Where the sentencing judge used the approved conditional formula giving credit for the full eligible remand period, an administrative miscalculation could later be corrected without converting the order into one under section 240(4). Applications alleging errors in remand or qualifying-curfew credit must ordinarily be made promptly. Exceptionally, the court may permit a late application where justice requires correction.

Five applicants sought leave to appeal against sentence or minimum-term decisions concerning credit for time on remand or under a qualifying curfew.

Leacock challenged a post-sentence correction which reduced the remand credit originally recorded, because part of the stated period had overlapped with an earlier imprisonment sentence. Blacker, Trevis and Nutting raised delayed claims concerning remand credit against indeterminate minimum terms. In Trevis’s case, the High Court had fixed the minimum term in R v Trevis [2005] EWHC 1840 (QB).

Morin claimed credit for a qualifying electronically monitored curfew which counsel had not raised at sentence. The central issues were the proper operation of former section 240 and the approach to very late applications for correction.

1. Leacock’s appeal was dismissed. Under section 240 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the only direction was one under section 240(3). Section 240(4)(a), read with Rule 2 of the Remand in Custody (Effect of Concurrent and Consecutive Sentences of Imprisonment) Rules 2005, mandatorily excluded days on which the offender was serving another imprisonment sentence. The court therefore had no power or discretion to credit those days.

2. Section 240(4) did not authorise a distinct order. It restricted when a section 240(3) direction could be made, while section 240(6) required the court to explain any failure to credit the full remand period. The contrary analysis in R (Hicks) v The Crown Court at Snaresbrook [2012] EWCA Crim 2515 was erroneous.

3. The sentencing judge had used the conditional formulation approved in Gordon [2007] EWCA Crim 165. That formulation made the stated number of eligible remand days subject to later administrative correction. The clerk could consequently amend the record from 184 to 115 days; the amended direction remained one under section 240(3).

4. Blacker’s and Trevis’s applications were refused. Their applications were made after substantial delay, when there was no proper basis for concluding that the sentencing courts had failed to allow for remand time.

5. Nutting’s and Morin’s applications were exceptionally allowed. Nutting was granted credit for 168 remand days against his minimum term. Morin was granted credit for 21 days, representing half of 43 days on a qualifying curfew. Advocates must investigate and raise such matters at sentence, and the court will apply time limits strictly in future.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Determined five applications for leave to appeal against sentence. It dismissed Leacock’s appeal, refused Blacker’s and Trevis’s late applications, and exceptionally allowed Nutting’s and Morin’s applications.

• High Court: In Trevis’s case, fixed a 16-year minimum term in R v Trevis [2005] EWHC 1840 (QB) .

• Crown Court: The underlying proceedings concerned sentences imposed at Guildford, Manchester, Birmingham and the Central Criminal Court, including life and imprisonment for public protection minimum terms.