Hopkinson, R. v

A conviction is unsafe where established jury intimidation and pressure pre-dated the verdict and caused the jury to be discharged before completing deliberations against a co-accused. The earlier verdict is affected by the same failure of the jury process.

A conviction cannot be quashed merely because the trial judge disagreed with the jury’s verdict. Responsibility for the verdict rests with the jury. Special verdicts should be exceptional, and are inappropriate for the offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, which addresses the evidential difficulty of identifying which of two defendants caused fatal injury to a child.

The appellant was convicted at Leeds Crown Court of causing or allowing the death of her infant daughter, contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. The jury also returned a special verdict that she had unlawfully caused the fatal injuries. Her co-accused, the child’s father, was awaiting verdict when reports emerged that jurors had experienced intimidation and one had been followed.

After an inquiry, the judge discharged the jury from returning a verdict on the co-accused. The intimidation had begun before the appellant’s conviction and special verdict. The appellant appealed against conviction. The central issue was whether her completed verdict could safely stand when the same jury had been discharged because of pressure affecting its deliberations.

1. The appeal was allowed. The conviction and special verdict were quashed, and a new trial was ordered on the original count.

2. The trial judge had conducted a careful inquiry into reports of intimidation. The evidence justified the decision to discharge the jury before it returned a verdict on the co-accused. The pressure and intimidation had begun before the jury retired and before it delivered its verdict against the appellant.

3. It would not be logical, fair or safe to preserve the appellant’s conviction while treating the same jury as unable safely to continue deliberations concerning the co-accused. The verdict already returned was affected by the same flaw. The jury process had failed, so the conviction was unsafe.

4. The court cautioned that a judge’s personal disagreement, however profound, with a jury verdict does not itself justify quashing a conviction. Such an approach would undermine the constitutional responsibility of the jury for the verdict. The appeal succeeded because of the compromised jury process, not because of the judge’s view of the evidence or verdict.

5. Special verdicts should be very rare, even in murder trials. They were particularly inappropriate under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, which was enacted for cases where the evidence cannot identify which of two defendants inflicted fatal injuries on a child. At the retrial, verdicts were to be sought only on the indictment, without any special verdict.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial.
• Crown Court at Leeds: On 11 February 2013, convicted the appellant of causing or allowing the death of a child under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 and received a special verdict that she had unlawfully caused the fatal injuries.