Cheshire East Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government & Ors

A planning decision letter must be read as a whole and in a straightforward manner. A court should not isolate one sentence when assessing whether the decision-maker misunderstood policy or failed to consider a material matter. Planning judgment and the weight given to competing considerations belong to the decision-maker, subject to rationality review. Prematurity justifies refusal only where a proposed development is sufficiently substantial, or its cumulative effect sufficiently significant, to prejudice an emerging development plan by predetermining decisions on scale, location or phasing. Reasons need address the principal controversial issues and disclose how issues of law and fact were resolved.

The claimant local planning authority challenged, under section 288(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the Secretary of State’s decision allowing an appeal against refusal of outline planning permission for up to 269 dwellings in Sandbach.

The challenge concerned prematurity, alleged failure to take account of the regional housing requirement, alleged misunderstanding of national prematurity policy, and alleged inadequacy of reasons. A separate ground concerning inconsistency with another planning decision was abandoned. The central issue was whether the decision letter, read as a whole, lawfully addressed the emerging Core Strategy and the prematurity argument.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Secretary of State was entitled to allow the planning appeal and had not erred in law in rejecting prematurity as a reason for refusal.

2. Planning judgment and the weight given to relevant considerations are matters for the decision-maker unless irrationality is established. A challenge under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288(1), is not an opportunity to reopen the planning merits. The court applied the principles stated in Seddon Properties v SSE (1981) 42 P&CR 26 and Newsmith v SSETR [2001] EWHC Admin 74.

3. Under paragraphs 17–19 of Planning System – General Principles 2005, prematurity may justify refusal where development is so substantial, or its cumulative effect so significant, that permission could prejudice an emerging development plan by predetermining decisions on the scale, location or phasing of development. The Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the proposed scheme did not meet that threshold.

4. The regional housing requirement had been taken into account. The decision letter identified the Regional Spatial Strategy as part of the extant development plan, relied on the housing shortfall, and expressly recognised that the Regional Strategy’s housing requirements formed the basis for determining the appeal. The final sentence of paragraph 25 could not properly be read in isolation.

5. The reasons were adequate. They enabled the reader to understand why the prematurity argument failed and how the relevant planning issues had been resolved. The court applied the approach in South Bucks DC v Porter (No.2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953.

6. CEBC was ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs, assessed on the standard basis if not agreed. The second defendant did not seek costs.