Belbin v Lille Court of First Instance, France

For double jeopardy to bar extradition under section 12, the requested offences must arise from the same or substantially the same facts as the earlier United Kingdom proceedings. Temporal or evidential overlap does not by itself establish that identity. The court must compare the underlying factual cases and the elements of the offences. Where the foreign offences concern materially different criminal conduct, extradition is not barred. There is no general obligation to prosecute in the United Kingdom every offence which could have been prosecuted there.

The appellant had been convicted in his absence by the Lille Court of First Instance of conspiracy, drug trafficking and money-laundering offences. France sought his extradition under a European Arrest Warrant. The District Judge ordered extradition on the conspiracy and money-laundering offences, and the appellant appealed.

In the United Kingdom, the appellant had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to supply cannabis and had been acquitted on a conspiracy to supply amphetamine count. He argued that the French proceedings arose from the same or substantially the same facts and that extradition was barred by section 12. The central issue was whether the factual and legal basis of the French offences sufficiently corresponded with the United Kingdom proceedings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant’s extradition was not barred by double jeopardy under section 12. He could raise any double-jeopardy argument before the French court on retrial.

2. The statutory comparison required examination of the underlying facts of the United Kingdom proceedings and the facts underlying the French case. Evidence-sharing, overlapping investigations and temporal overlap did not make the cases the same or substantially the same. The court would be reluctant to undermine cross-border investigative co-operation unless the factual position was clear.

3. The United Kingdom counts concerned conspiracies to supply specified drugs. The French proceedings concerned conspiracy and money-laundering conduct involving the transport and handling of criminal proceeds through France and the Netherlands. The elements of the offences were materially different, and the French offences were not reflected in anything charged or likely to be charged in the United Kingdom.

4. There was no authority establishing an obligation to prosecute in the United Kingdom an offence which could have been prosecuted there. Section 12 did not prohibit extradition merely because domestic authorities might arguably have prosecuted related money-laundering conduct. A prior domestic acquittal or conviction for such an offence might have raised a different issue, but no such prosecution had occurred.

5. The appellant was entitled to a retrial in France within two months of arrival, and his French convictions were understood to be set aside for that purpose.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal from the District Judge’s extradition decision was dismissed. The District Judge had ordered extradition on the conspiracy and three money-laundering offences.