T, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice & Anor

Children and Young Persons Act 1933, section 31 requires arrangements preventing children and young persons from associating with adult defendants while detained, conveyed to or from court, or awaiting court proceedings. The obligation is fact-specific. It extends beyond shared cells or meaningful social interaction to transitory contact and physical proximity where these create the risks addressed by the provision. It does not require separate court buildings or wholly separate custody areas. Compliance must be assessed in the circumstances of the individual young person and the arrangements operating at the relevant time.

The claimant, a 13-year-old with significant intellectual impairment, autism and ADHD, was arrested for breaching bail and detained for about three hours at Birmingham Magistrates’ Court before appearing in the Youth Court. The usual cells for young persons were unavailable while being refurbished. He was held in a cell opposite the custody desk, passed adult defendants in the corridor and heard adults shouting.

He sought judicial review on the grounds of breach of section 31 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, article 8 of the Convention and section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

1. Section 31 claim allowed. The court held that the arrangements operating on 15 November 2011 did not prevent the claimant from associating with adult defendants as required by section 31 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.

2. Section 31 must be interpreted by reference to its statutory language, history and purpose. The required arrangements must prevent young persons from speaking, communicating or interacting with adult defendants. They may also need to address transitory contact or physical proximity where those circumstances create the moral and welfare risks contemplated by the section. The provision does not require separate court buildings or entirely separate custody areas.

3. Compliance is highly fact-specific. The court must consider the arrangements available at the particular court and the age and vulnerability of the young person. Separate cells and escort by detention officers may be insufficient where the circumstances still permit harmful contact or proximity.

4. The international instruments relied upon could not assist in interpreting section 31. Treaties have no binding force in domestic law unless incorporated by statute, and the Beijing Rules were not binding. The court rejected a wholesale introduction of those instruments into domestic law.

5. Article 8 was engaged, but the claim failed. The claimant’s detention at court was the inevitable consequence of the lawful police decision to detain him pending his appearance. The custody staff had no discretion to release him, and the location of his detention did not create a separate article 8 issue.

6. The section 149 equality duty was satisfied. The Ministry of Justice had established contractual requirements, guidance, operating procedures and supervision arrangements addressing the treatment and separation of young persons detained at court.

7. The judicial review therefore succeeded only on the section 31 ground.