Wilcock v Lancaster City Council

A hackney carriage vehicle may be suspended under section 68 of the Local Government (MP) Act 1976 for breach of a licence condition. The statutory concept of vehicle fitness is not confined to roadworthiness or mechanical condition. Section 68 provides a short, summary process for defects capable of prompt remediation, including signage breaches. A previous certificate of compliance does not create an expectation that the licensing authority will refrain from changing or enforcing its policy during the certificate’s currency. Legitimate expectation requires overall unfairness or unconscionability. Proportionality is assessed with appropriate respect for the authority’s judgment, having regard to the ease and cost of rectification, the duration and effect of the suspension, prior notice, and available judicial review or appeal.

The claimant held a hackney carriage vehicle licence granted by Lancaster City Council. The vehicle displayed additional taxi signage contrary to the Council’s licence conditions. After complaints about similar signage, the Council adopted a stricter enforcement policy, issued a defect notice, and then suspended the licence under section 68 of the Local Government (MP) Act 1976.

The claimant sought judicial review, arguing that the suspension breached a substantive legitimate expectation, was ultra vires because section 68 was confined to roadworthiness, and was disproportionate under Article 1 of the First Protocol. The suspension issue had become academic because the vehicle licence had expired and the condition could be challenged before the magistrates’ court, but the court addressed the grounds because of their potential relevance to costs and wider statutory interpretation.

1. The claim was dismissed. The court held that a legitimate expectation requires a representation and overall unfairness or unconscionability. Earlier certificates of compliance did not clearly promise that the Council would maintain its existing enforcement policy throughout the certificate period. In any event, the signage could be removed safely, cheaply and quickly, the claimant had received prior notice, and the issue could then be pursued through the proper appeal process. Ground 1 therefore failed.
2. Section 68 of the Local Government (MP) Act 1976 was not confined to roadworthiness. The word fitness had the same meaning in sections 60 and 68 and could include breach of a licence condition. Section 68 created a short and summary remedial process, distinct from section 60, for matters capable of being dealt with promptly. The absence of a substantive appeal during the suspension period did not require a narrower construction, since judicial review remained available. Ground 2 failed.
3. The additional signage was not trivial. The licensing scheme legitimately sought to ensure that hackney carriages and private hire vehicles could readily be distinguished and that identifying features were not obscured by excessive clutter. The Council was entitled to enforce that policy more strictly following complaints.
4. The court expressed a strong inclination that the vehicle licence was not a possession or item of property for Article 1 of the First Protocol, relying on the reasoning in R (Royden) v Wirral Metropolitan BC [2002] EWHC Admin 2484. It was unnecessary to decide the point finally. Even assuming that the Article was engaged, the interference was proportionate: the defect was readily curable, suspension lasted at most two months, judicial review was available, and the suspension affected the vehicle licence rather than the claimant’s driver’s licence. Ground 3 failed.
5. The Council was not required to use section 60 rather than section 68, nor was issuing the suspension notice a disproportionate decision merely because the matter could have been left until renewal.

This was a first-instance judicial review. Interim relief was granted on 26 November 2012 and permission was granted on 4 January 2013. The claimant’s separate appeal concerning the licence condition was pending before the magistrates’ court and had been adjourned or stayed pending this judgment.