IA, R (on the application of) v City of Westminster Council (Rev 1)

A housing authority must investigate a homelessness application inquisitorially where there is reason to believe that the applicant may be homeless, eligible and in priority need. The applicant need not prove the case. Inquiries into vulnerability may require medical evidence, consultation with relevant professionals and examination of the applicant’s circumstances and support network. A brief interview and cursory medical assessment cannot lawfully screen out an application involving significant mental-health issues, trauma or physical disability. The statutory interim duty arises on the low “reason to believe” threshold. A decision whether to accommodate pending review must fairly assess the merits, new information and the applicant’s personal circumstances.

The claimant, an Iranian refugee with a history of torture, depression, panic attacks, insomnia and physical pain, faced homelessness after his private landlord served notice. City of Westminster Council decided under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 that he was homeless and eligible but not in priority need. It refused both interim accommodation under section 188(1) and discretionary accommodation pending review under section 188(3).

The claimant sought judicial review of the section 184 decision, the alleged failure to perform the interim duty, and the refusal to accommodate pending review. He also sought continuation of an interim mandatory injunction. The court considered whether the authority had made the inquiries required by Part VII and whether its decisions were lawful and rational.

1. Permission and interim relief. The claimant had very strong or good prospects of establishing that the section 184 decision and the interim-accommodation decisions were unlawful. Permission to apply for judicial review was therefore granted, and the interim mandatory injunction requiring accommodation was continued until the review decision became available.
2. Section 184 inquiries. The inquiry is inquisitorial and the applicant does not have to prove his case. A housing authority must promptly screen the application and, where there is reason to believe that Part VII duties may be engaged, conduct sufficient inquiries before deciding priority need. In a case involving depression, trauma, isolation, physical disability and limited support, this would ordinarily include consultation with medical advisers and relevant mental-health services, and potentially further psychiatric assessment. The authority’s one-hour interview and reliance on a short GP report did not amount to the required inquiry.
3. Vulnerability. Vulnerability must be assessed on the basis that the applicant is homeless. The authority must consider whether he would be less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person and would suffer injury or detriment where that person could cope. Relevant circumstances included the nature and extent of illness, its relationship to housing difficulties, the applicant’s way of life and available support. The authority failed to undertake that assessment and its conclusion was arguably irrational and perverse.
4. Interim accommodation. The section 188(1) threshold is low. Once the original decision was materially flawed, the authority had good reason to be in breach of its duty by failing to provide accommodation pending a lawful decision. Its section 188(3) decision also failed to assess the merits of the review, the substantial new information and the claimant’s personal circumstances, and was arguably Wednesbury unreasonable.
5. The claimant was awarded the costs of the injunction proceedings, to be assessed forthwith with the public-funding assessment.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. The judgment itself does not state any prior judicial decision in the same proceedings.