Campbell v Public Prosecutor of the Grande Instance Tribunal of St-Malo, France

Extradition may constitute an abuse of process where the requesting authority seeks to rely on a conviction warrant following an unfair trial in absentia, and the change from an accusation warrant causes unfair prejudice. The abuse test asks whether extradition in the particular circumstances would offend the court’s sense of justice, commonly through unfair prejudice or deliberate manipulation of the process.

For the passage-of-time bar under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, “unjust” and “oppressive” are distinct but overlapping concepts. The provision does not require extreme or exceptional circumstances. Relevant considerations include the gravity of the offence, culpable delay, and changes in the requested person’s circumstances.

Owen Campbell was convicted and sentenced in France in his absence for smuggling counterfeit cigarettes. He had not been summoned to the trial or informed of its date or venue.

France first sought his extradition under an accusation European arrest warrant. After his conviction, it issued a conviction warrant, on which the Westminster Magistrates’ Court ordered extradition. District Judge Coleman’s order of 28 March 2013 was appealed to the Administrative Court.

The central issues were whether seeking extradition under the conviction warrant abused the extradition process, whether the passage of time barred extradition, and whether the warrant contained sufficient information.

1. Appeal allowed. The order of District Judge Coleman was set aside.

2. The core abuse-of-process question was whether the requesting authority had acted so that extradition in the particular circumstances would offend the court’s sense of justice. This ordinarily involves unfair prejudice in resisting extradition or on return, although deliberate manipulation or bad faith is not essential.

3. The reasoning in Federal Public Prosecutor, Brussels, Belgium v Bartlett [2012] EWHC 2480 (Admin) applied. A person convicted in absentia after an objectively unfair procedure should not, for extradition purposes, be treated as an ordinary convicted person. The appropriate course was to continue with the accusation warrant. Seeking extradition on the conviction warrant could deprive the person of protections available under the accusation warrant.

4. Mr Campbell would be entitled to a retrial under sections 20(5) and 20(7) of the Extradition Act 2003. The information in the conviction warrant was also sufficient. It identified one offence relating to the intercepted consignment; evidence concerning earlier consignments was relevant to proof and sentence.

5. Section 14 of the Act required consideration of whether extradition would be unjust or oppressive by reason of the relevant delay. “Unjust” primarily concerns prejudice to the trial, while “oppressive” concerns hardship resulting from changed circumstances. The statutory language imposed no requirement of extreme or exceptional injustice or oppression.

6. The delay since the alleged offence was substantial, unexplained and potentially culpable. Mr Campbell’s family circumstances had materially changed, and the offence, although serious, was not of the utmost gravity. The delay would have made extradition oppressive and unjust if measured from the date of the offence, though not if measured from the later conviction date. That difference meant that extradition under the conviction warrant was an abuse of process.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Coleman ordered Mr Campbell’s extradition to France on 28 March 2013.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was allowed and the extradition order was set aside.