Turner v Chief Land Registrar

A squatter in adverse possession has a legal estate in fee simple absolute in possession, even though the paper owner has a relatively better title until limitation expires. The statutory exclusion of freehold owners from lodging cautions against first registration therefore applies to such a squatter. A squatter’s possessory or overriding interest does not affect the paper owner’s qualifying estate for the purposes of the alternative statutory route. The court cannot read down clear statutory language merely because the statutory policy would have supported a different result. Denial of a caution, which gives only procedural protection and no interest in land, does not substantially interfere with the occupier’s Article 8 rights where rectification of the register remains available.

The claimant had lived in a caravan as a squatter in adverse possession of unregistered land since October 2007. He later obtained planning permission for its use as a private gypsy and traveller site. He sought a declaration that he was entitled under the Land Registration Act 2002 to lodge a caution against first registration.

The Registrar refused the application. The claimant relied principally on section 15(1)(a), contending that his interest was not a freehold estate excluded by section 15(3)(a)(i). Alternatively, he relied on section 15(1)(b), asserting an overriding interest affecting the paper owner’s estate. He also argued that section 15 should be interpreted under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to avoid interference with his Article 8 rights.

1. The claim was dismissed. A person in adverse possession has, for the purposes of English land law, a legal estate in fee simple absolute in possession. The relativity of title means that the paper owner may have a better title and may eject the squatter, but that does not alter the character of the squatter’s estate.
2. Section 1(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 permits only two legal estates: a fee simple absolute in possession and a term of years absolute. The claimant had no term of years and no merely equitable interest. His estate was therefore a freehold estate.
3. Section 15(3)(a)(i) accordingly prevented him from lodging a caution as owner of a qualifying estate. The statutory policy is that a freehold owner should register the estate rather than use a caution as a substitute for registration. Although that policy did not apply fully to a squatter who could not yet register, Parliament had not created an exception.
4. The alternative claim under section 15(1)(b) also failed. The claimant’s overriding interest did not affect the paper owner’s qualifying estate. An interest under Schedule 1 concerns the effect of registration on the estate, not an interest affecting the paper owner’s estate for section 15 purposes.
5. There was no basis for reading down the clear language of section 15 under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The land was capable of being the claimant’s home for Article 8 purposes, but refusal of a caution, which provides only procedural protection, was not a substantial interference. If an erroneous registration occurred, he could seek alteration or rectification of the register.
6. The question whether the claimant would have an overriding interest as a person in actual occupation, given his nomadic movements, did not need to be decided. Such an interest would not override registration of the paper owner, and standing to seek rectification did not depend on proving it.

First-instance Part 8 claim in the High Court (Chancery Division). No prior appellate decision was stated.